Study on impact of political connections of Chinese private listed companies on R&D activities

Abstract

Abstract: This paper investigates the impact of political connection of the Chinese private listed companies on their R&D activities by using the data of 599 publicly listed Chinese companies in the period of 2005-2009. The empirical study shows that the political connections of Chinese private companies are conducive to the R&D activities and that the political connections of the companies in different locations may have different impact on the R&D activities. This finding shows that the political connections of the companies in the transitional economic body may significantly affect the company operation, which means the political connections are complementary to the market mechanism.

Key words: political connection, R&D activity, geographical location

CLC Number:

F276.5

Kang Hua, Wang Luping, Yang Liuqing. Study on impact of political connections of Chinese private listed companies on R&D activities[J]. Science Research Management, 2013, 34(8): 9-16.

References

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