The game mechanism for dynamic evolution of regional innovation system

Abstract

Abstract: Regional innovation system is the system that consists of cooperative innovation, learning decision, and dynamic game between enterprises and research institutions. In order to reveal complexities and the dynamic evolution path of regional innovation system, both learning competition model and evolutionary game model are introduced into the research on the initial conditions and inner decision factors of dynamic evolution for the regional innovation system, the cooperative innovation process of enterprises and research institutions and the evolution of cooperative innovation patterns under dynamic environment conditions are analyzed by building a learning competition model and an evolutionary game model between enterprises and scientific research institutions. The results show that the evolution direction of regional innovation system is related not only to the pay matrix of the two sides of the game, their learning behavior and ability, but also to the initial state of regional innovation system evolution. Moreover, the key factors affecting the dynamic evolution of regional innovation system are the cooperative income, loss caused by risk, initial cost in the cooperative innovation between research institutions and enterprises, and bilateral discount factor.

Key words: regional innovation system, evolution, learning behavior, evolutionary game

CLC Number:

F 207 F224.32

Wang Xiangbing, Yan Guangle, Yang Weizhong. The game mechanism for dynamic evolution of regional innovation system[J]. Science Research Management, 2012, 33(11): 1-8.

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