Technology spillover, R&D investment, and the effect of social welfare

Abstract

Abstract: Based on the AJ model, the three-stage Cournot game model considering horizontal and vertical technology spillovers is built. From the equilibrium solution by using reverse induction, the effects of technology spillover on firm R&D investment and social welfare are investigated with different cooperate R&D modes. It is found that except non-cooperation case, firm R&D investments always increase with the vertical spillover increasing. Under the conditions of mixed cooperation and horizontal cooperation, R&D investment and social welfare increase with horizontal spillover, however the effect of vertical spillover on social welfare is uncertain. Under the conditions of vertical cooperation and non-cooperation, the effect of vertical spillover on R&D investment and social welfare is uncertain, meanwhile social welfare always increases with the vertical spillover.

Key words: technology spillover, R&D investment, social welfare

CLC Number:

F426

Sun Xiaohua, Zheng Hui. Technology spillover, R&D investment, and the effect of social welfare[J]. Science Research Management, 2012, 33(9): 47-53.

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