Based on the analysis of the effects of emission tax, auction emission permit, and tradable emission permit on enterprise green technology innovation, following conclusions are obtained: The major influential factors of enterprise abatement are green technology innovation ability and the rigorousness of environmental regulations. The major influential factors of enterprise violations are the rigorousness of environmental regulations and government monitoring force, and have nothing to do with the enterprise green technology innovation ability. Through the comparative analysis on different environmental regulations, it is found that both emission tax rate and emission permit price are positive related with incentives to enterprise green technology innovation; From the perspective of the incentives, both emission tax and auction emission permit will have the same policy effects, while tradable emission permit will have the weakest policy effects on enterprise green technology innovation, if the government does not control the quantity of tradable emission permit. These three environmental regulations will have the same policy effects on enterprise green technology innovation if the government effectively controls the quantity of tradable emission permit.
Key words
abatement /
green technology /
environmental regulation /
comparative analysis
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