市场化程度视角下的民营企业政治关联与研发

科研管理 ›› 2012, Vol. ›› Issue (10): 48-55.

市场化程度视角下的民营企业政治关联与研发

江雅雯, 黄燕, 徐雯

汕头大学商学院, 广东汕头 515063

收稿日期:2011-05-10 修回日期:2011-10-19 出版日期:2012-10-27 发布日期:2012-10-22
基金资助:
本文得到基金项目:1、2009汕头市科技计划项目"基于顾客导向的企业自主创新模式研究"项目编号:152,2009-2011年;2、汕头大学学术创新团队建设项目:《中小企业管理创新研究,项目编号为ITC10004,2010-2012年》的资助。

The political connections and R&D of private enterprises basedon the perspective of marketization degree

Jiang Yawen, Huang Yan, Xu Wen

School of Business, Shantou University, Shantou 515063, China

Received:2011-05-10 Revised:2011-10-19 Online:2012-10-27 Published:2012-10-22

摘要/Abstract

摘要： 本文围绕不同市场化程度的地区民营企业的政治关联与企业研发投资的相关性进行研究。使用世界银行在中国开展的投资环境调查的数据,在控制了一系列影响企业研发投资的因素后,得出的主要结论如下:(1)建立政治关联的民营企业参与研发的积极性高于没有政治关联的企业;(2)民营企业所在的地区的市场化程度越低、经济越不发达,政治关联对研发参与的促进作用也越大。

关键词: 市场化程度, 民营企业, 政治关联, 研发参与

Abstract: The relationships between private enterprise’s political connections and their investments on R&D among different regions of China with diverse marketization degree are focused on. Using the investment climate survey conducted by World Bank in China and controlling a series of relative factors, the following findings are obtained: (1) the political connected private enterprises are more likely to conduct R&D activities than non-political connected companies; (2) the lower the marketization degree and the more backward economic development a region is, the more noticeable the effect mentioned above is.

Key words: marketization degree, private enterprise, political connection, R&D participation

中图分类号:

F272.3

江雅雯, 黄燕, 徐雯. 市场化程度视角下的民营企业政治关联与研发[J]. 科研管理, 2012, (10): 48-55.

Jiang Yawen, Huang Yan, Xu Wen. The political connections and R&D of private enterprises basedon the perspective of marketization degree[J]. Science Research Management, 2012, (10): 48-55.

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