本文建立了一个经济学模型,其中一个非生产性的技术研发企业决定如何向两个生产性企业转让降低成本的技术,两个生产性企业在产品市场上进行Stackelberg竞争。本文的研究表明,技术拥有企业的最优决策不仅取决于其技术创新的程度而且取决于技术转让的合同形式。在固定收费合同下,如果新技术的创新程度较低(高),那么技术拥有者偏好向先(后)进入市场的企业转让其技术;在特许权收费合同下,技术拥有企业会向两个企业同时授权其技术;但是在双重收费合同下,技术拥有者的最优策略是只向跟随企业转让其技术。三种合同相比,双重收费合同不仅会使技术拥有者的授权利润达到最大,而且会使社会福利水平达到最高,从而实现了企业个体目标与社会整体目标的完美一致。
Abstract
A model is developed in which a nonproductive firm decides to license its cost reducing innovation to two firms; these two firms compete with each other on the product market in Stackelberg fashion. It is shown that the optimal choice for patent holder depends on both the licensing contract and the degree of innovation. Specifically, with a fixed-fee contract, the patent holding firm prefers to license its technology to the Stackelberg leader (follower) if the degree of innovation is small (large). With a royalty contract, the patent holder is likely to transfer its technology to two firms. However, with a two-part tariff contract, it is optimal to sell the technology to the market follower. Two-part tariff contract not only produces a maximal licensing profit, but also generates a maximal social welfare, the fact implies that the licensing decision of the patent holder achieves at Pareto optimal.
关键词
技术授权(转让) /
授权对象选择 /
Stackelberg竞争 /
社会福利
Key words
technology licensing /
licensing choice /
Stackelberg competition /
social welfare
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参考文献
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基金
教育部人文社会科学研究青年基金项目(12YJC790185);山东省社会科学规划研究青年基金项目(11DJJZ01);烟台大学博士启动基金项目(JG11D09)。
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