CEO股权激励对企业数字化转型意愿的影响研究

doi:10.19571/j.cnki.1000-2995.2024.12.018

科研管理 ›› 2024, Vol. 45 ›› Issue (12): 169-176.DOI: 10.19571/j.cnki.1000-2995.2024.12.018

CEO股权激励对企业数字化转型意愿的影响研究

王雪冬¹,杨嘉璐²,孟佳佳³

1.大连海事大学航运经济与管理学院，辽宁大连116026;
2.武汉大学经济与管理学院，湖北武汉430072;
3.辽宁大学经济学部新华国际商学院，辽宁沈阳110036

收稿日期:2023-12-30 修回日期:2024-11-09 出版日期:2024-12-20 发布日期:2024-12-06
通讯作者: 孟佳佳
基金资助:
国家社会科学基金一般项目：“国有企业开展颠覆式创新的制度困境与政策设计研究”（24BJL091，2024—2027）。

Research on the impact of CEO equity incentive on the willingness of corporate digital transformation

Wang Xuedong¹, Yang Jialu², Meng Jiajia³

1. School of Maritime Economics and Management, Dalian Maritime University, Dalian 116026, Liaoning, China; 2. School of Economics and Management, Wuhan University, Wuhan 430072, Hubei, China; 3. Sunwah International Business School, Faculty of Economics, Liaoning University, Shenyang 110036, Liaoning, China

Received:2023-12-30 Revised:2024-11-09 Online:2024-12-20 Published:2024-12-06
Contact: Meng Jiajia

摘要/Abstract

摘要： 在企业数字化转型如火如荼的当下，CEO股权激励被认为是提升企业数字化转型意愿的利器，但这种理论共识在实际中却效果迥异。针对这一理论与实践冲突，本文基于高阶理论和动机理论，采用计量分析方法，以2001年至2021年期间的A股上市公司为样本，实证分析了CEO股权激励对企业数字化转型意愿的影响。研究结果表明，CEO股权激励对企业数字化转型意愿存在倒U型影响，即随着CEO持股比例增加，CEO股权激励对企业数字化转型意愿的影响呈现出先提高后降低的非线性变化趋势；管理者短视在其中发挥了中介作用，即CEO股权激励通过对管理者短视的正U型影响进而形成了对企业数字化转型意愿的非线性影响；CEO职业生涯关注则在CEO股权激励与企业数字化转型意愿之间起调节作用，即CEO职业生涯关注会延缓CEO促进焦点的过快降低、抑制CEO防御焦点的过早出现，从而使CEO股权激励对企业数字化转型意愿的倒U型影响趋于平缓。本文突破了CEO股权激励正向影响企业数字化转型意愿的刻板共识，从CEO动机视角丰富了领导力与数字化转型的交叉研究，促进了高阶理论在数字化转型领域的应用和发展，揭示了CEO股权激励对企业数字化转型意愿的非线性影响及其中介机制黑箱，为企业有效激励CEO推动数字化转型提供了理论启示。

关键词: 数字化转型意愿, CEO股权激励, CEO职业生涯关注, 管理者短视

Abstract: In the current era of rapid digital transformation of enterprises, the CEO equity incentive is considered to be a powerful tool to increase the willingness of companies to embrace digital transformation. However, the effectiveness of this theoretical consensus varies in practice. To address this discrepancy between theory and practice, this study, based on the upper-echelon theory and motivation theory, employed the econometric analysis to empirically examine the impact of CEO equity incentives on firms′ willingness to implement digital transformation by using a sample of Ashare listed firms from 2001 to 2021. The results indicated that a non-linear relationship between CEO equity incentive and firms′ willingness to adopt digital transformation, characterized by an inverted U-shaped effect. Specifically, as CEO shareholding increases, the impact of CEO equity incentives on firms′ willingness to pursue digital transformation initially increases and then decreases. Management shortsightedness plays a mediating role in this relationship, as CEO equity incentive exerts a positive U-shaped influence on management shortsightedness, which in turn leads to the non-linear effect on firms′ willingness to pursue digital transformation. In addition, CEO career concerns moderate the relationship between CEO equity incentives and firms′ willingness to embrace digital transformation. Specifically, CEO career concerns mitigate the rapid decline in CEO promotional focus and suppress the premature emergence of CEO preventive focus, thereby smoothing the inverted U-shaped effect of CEO equity incentive on firms′ willingness to embrace digital transformation. This study has challenged the stereotypical consensus that CEO equity incentive positively affects firms′ willingness to pursue digital transformation, and will enrich the crossresearch on leadership and digital transformation from the perspective of CEO motivation. Furthermore, it will promote the application and development of the upper-echelon theory in the field of digital transformation by revealing the non-linear impact of CEO equity incentives on firms′ willingness to engage in digital transformation and the black box of the mediating mechanism involved. Overall, this study will provide theoretical insights for effectively incentivizing CEOs to drive digital transformation in firms.

Key words: digital transformation willingness, CEO equity incentive, CEO career concern, management shortsightedness

王雪冬杨嘉璐孟佳佳. CEO股权激励对企业数字化转型意愿的影响研究[J]. 科研管理, 2024, 45(12): 169-176.

Wang Xuedong, Yang Jialu, Meng Jiajia. Research on the impact of CEO equity incentive on the willingness of corporate digital transformation[J]. Science Research Management, 2024, 45(12): 169-176.

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CEO股权激励对企业数字化转型意愿的影响研究

Research on the impact of CEO equity incentive on the willingness of corporate digital transformation

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