管理层激励、机构投资者持股与企业异质研发

马庆魁; 樊梦晨

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科研管理 ›› 2021, Vol. 42 ›› Issue (9) : 140-149.

论文

管理层激励、机构投资者持股与企业异质研发

马庆魁,樊梦晨

作者信息 +

Management incentives, institutional investor shareholding, and corporate heterogeneous R&D investment

Ma Qingkui, Fan Mengchen

Author information +

文章历史 +

摘要

本文旨在从异质性视角深入探讨管理层激励方式对企业研发投资的影响。在回顾相关理论的基础上，提出了关于管理层股权激励和薪酬激励对企业异质研发投资影响以及机构投资者持股对影响关系调节效应的基本假设，并利用中国上市公司2007—2016年的面板数据，采用两阶段最小二乘法（2SLS）进行了实证检验。研究结果表明：股权激励对研究投资和试验开发投资均有显著促进作用；薪酬激励对试验开发投资有正向影响，与研究投资间的关系则呈倒“U”型；随着持股比例的上升，机构投资者对企业投资决策的监督作用增强，这强化了股权激励对两种研发投资的促进作用，但薪酬激励对两种研发投资的影响被挤出；研发投资不仅可以提升企业当期绩效，对其未来绩效也有着积极影响，且研究投资和试验开发投资对企业未来绩效影响的持续期数存在明显差异。本文从异质性视角拓展了创新激励理论，对企业创新激励机制设计实践也具有一定的启发意义。

Abstract

This paper aims to explore the impacts of management incentives on corporate R&D investment from the perspective of heterogeneity. Based on the review of relevant theories, this paper puts forward hypotheses about the impacts of equity incentive and compensation incentive on heterogeneous R&D investment and the moderating effect of institutional investor shareholding on the above relationships. Then, using the panel data of Chinese listed companies from 2007 to 2016, the two-stage least square method (2SLS) is adopted to conduct an empirical test. The results show that equity incentive has a significant promoting effect on both research investment and development investment. Compensation incentive has a positive effect on development investment, while the relationship between compensation incentive and research investment shows an inverted "U" shape. With the increase of the shareholding ratio, the supervisory role of institutional investors on corporate investment decision becomes stronger, which strengthens the impacts of equity incentive on research investment and development investment, and crowds out the impacts of compensation incentive. R&D investment can not only improve the current corporate performance, but also have positive effects on future corporate performances, and there is an obvious period difference between the impacts of research investment and development investment on future corporate performances.
The possible theoretical contributions of this paper are as follows. First, based on the perspective of heterogeneity, the impact mechanisms of equity incentive and compensation incentive on research investment and development investment are explored, and conclusions such as the threshold effect of the impact of compensation incentive on research investment are obtained. This makes up for the lack of structural attention to R&D investment and expands the research on management incentives and corporate R&D investment. Second, the promoting or crowding-out effect of institutional investor shareholding (external governance mechanism) on management incentives (internal governance mechanism) is also considered, which makes up for the lack of previous studies that focused on the impact of a single governance mechanism on corporate R&D investment, brings the internal and external governance mechanisms into a unified analysis framework, and expands the research on corporate governance and corporate R&D investment.
According to the above conclusions, the policy implications of this paper are as follows. First, companies should establish an equity incentive mechanism that adapts to innovation-driven development, appropriately improve the level of equity incentive, and expand the coverage of equity incentive. It is necessary to improve the level of equity incentive of top management through various methods such as equity awards and stock options, and include core R&D personnel and management personnel into the scope of equity incentive through employee shareholding plans. Thus, the level of R&D investment that can increase the long-term corporate value can be increased, and the problem of weak long-term performance growth caused by insufficient R&D investment can be solved. Second, companies should appropriately control the level of top management compensation, link compensation to reasonable consumption, design a top management incentive system that adapts to the long-term corporate development in combination with equity incentive, and avoid insufficient or excessive R&D investment caused by the risk attitude of top management. Third, in order to improve the performance of top management and enhance the long-term corporate value, the institutional investor shareholding ratio should be increased, and the external supervision mechanism of top management should be improved with the help of professional institutional investors. Fourth, corporate R&D investment not only positively affects current performance, but also has significant promoting effects on future performances. Companies should pay sufficient attention to the transition of R&D investment from the research stage to the development stage, so as to ensure the continuity of benefits.

导出引用

马庆魁樊梦晨. 管理层激励、机构投资者持股与企业异质研发[J]. 科研管理. 2021, 42(9): 140-149

Ma Qingkui, Fan Mengchen. Management incentives, institutional investor shareholding, and corporate heterogeneous R&D investment[J]. Science Research Management. 2021, 42(9): 140-149

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