保护性专利审查机制与中外企业的专利战略选择—基于专利授权和条件寿命期的视角

张古鹏, 王崇锋

科研管理 ›› 2014, Vol. 35 ›› Issue (5) : 9-18.

科研管理 ›› 2014, Vol. 35 ›› Issue (5) : 9-18.
论文

保护性专利审查机制与中外企业的专利战略选择—基于专利授权和条件寿命期的视角

  • 张古鹏1, 王崇锋2
作者信息 +

Protective patent examination mechanism and options of patent strategy between Chinese and foreign firms:Based on the perspective of patent grant and provisional life

  • Zhang Gupeng1, Wang Chongfeng2
Author information +
文章历史 +

摘要

由于技术创新能力与发达国家有较大差距,我国实行了保护性的专利审查机制,使国内企业能够更容易并更快速地获取专利权。国外企业在中国要想获取专利权往往需要等待更长时间,且获取专利权的难度大于国内企业。我们从专利授权和条件寿命期视角,结合企业的专利战略考虑对这种保护性审查机制的有效性进行了探讨。从申请专利保护的技术垄断效果看,保护性审查机制限制了国外企业专利竞争战略的实施。然而,相较于国内企业,国外企业出于专利市场收益的不确定性考虑,更倾向于延长专利的条件寿命期,保护性审查机制延迟授予国外企业专利权的做法无疑更有益于其专利市场战略的展开。另一方面,由于国内企业获取专利权相对容易,使得一些技术含量低、市场收益水平不高的专利被授权,增加了企业的专利权维持费用。因此,从专利战略视角看,保护性专利审查机制并不完全有利于国内企业。

Abstract

Since there is a large innovation capability gap between China and developed countries, China implements protective patent examination mechanism, which facilitates domestic firms to get patent right easier and sooner. Foreign firms need to wait longer to get patent right, and it is more difficult for foreign firms to get patent right. We examine the effect of patent examination mechanism from perspective of patent grant and provisional life. By analyzing the technology monopoly effect of patent protection, we find that protective patent examination mechanism prevents foreign firms from implementing patent competition strategy. However, compared with domestic firms, foreign firms pay more attention to the market income mobilization of patent, hence they tend to extend patents' provisional life. Since protective patent examination mechanism further extends patent provisional life of foreign firms, it is more beneficial for foreign firms to implement patent market strategy. On the other hand, since it is easier for domestic firms to get patent right, large number of patents with low level of technology and low market income are granted, which increases firms' patent renewal fee. Therefore, from the perspective of patent strategy, protective patent examination mechanism is not fully beneficial to domestic firms.

关键词

专利 / 审查机制 / 专利战略 / 条件寿命期 / 专利授权

Key words

patent / examination mechanism / patent strategy / provisional life / patent grant

引用本文

导出引用
张古鹏, 王崇锋. 保护性专利审查机制与中外企业的专利战略选择—基于专利授权和条件寿命期的视角[J]. 科研管理. 2014, 35(5): 9-18
Zhang Gupeng, Wang Chongfeng. Protective patent examination mechanism and options of patent strategy between Chinese and foreign firms:Based on the perspective of patent grant and provisional life[J]. Science Research Management. 2014, 35(5): 9-18
中图分类号: F406.3   

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基金

教育部人文社科基金青年基金(13YJC630219),北京市自然科学基金青年基金(9144036),青岛市软科学项目(基金号:12-1-3-84-(6)-zhc)资助。


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