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投资组合规模对技术创新的溢出效应研究——基于公司创投的企业共生视角
Corporate venture capital symbiosis: The impact of portfolio size on technological innovation
如何引导金融资本服务实体企业创新发展,是中国当前经济发展中的重要战略问题。已有研究普遍从公司创业投资的“单一主体”、母公司与创业企业的“竞争关系”展开,忽视了公司创投驱动的多主体(母公司、公司创投机构、创业企业),尤其是母公司与创业企业的价值共享。本文以1998年至2022年间获得公司创投扶持并成功上市的A股公司为研究对象,通过计算每个公司创投机构排除个体特征和外部环境限制后的超额投资组合规模,讨论投资组合规模对被投企业技术创新的溢出效应,以及对母公司的战略影响,探讨中国情境下公司创投的共生机制和价值共创路径。实证检验发现,投资组合规模促进了被投企业技术创新产出,同时投资组合规模对被投企业创新的溢出效应,也帮助母公司更有效地获取新的技术增长点,为母公司创新绩效创造价值。机制检验表明:投资组合规模通过技术纽带机制、失败容忍机制和关系网络机制,对被投企业技术创新发挥正向的溢出效应。拓展性分析表明:投资组合规模在公司创投机构专业能力较弱、单独投资或领投机构具有政府背景时,对企业技术创新的溢出效应更强。本文结论在一定程度上回应了公司创业投资调整资本要素从短期的“风险与收益平衡”转向匹配“长期价值创造”的创新激励机制,为促进大中小企业融通发展,构建富有成效和活力的创新生态系统提供启示。
Guiding financial capital to facilitate innovation in real-economy enterprises constitutes a critical strategic priority in China’s economic development. While existing studies predominantly examine corporate venture capital(CVC) through the lens of single-entity participation and parent-subsidiary competition, they largely overlook the multi-agent system involving parent firms, CVC institutions, and portfolio ventures, particularly the value-sharing dynamics between parent companies and their invested enterprises. This study analyzed A-share listed companies receiving CVC support from 1998 to 2022, employing a novel metric of excess portfolio scale that controls for firm-specific characteristics and environmental constraints. We systematically investigated how portfolio scale generates technological innovation spillovers in portfolio firms and created strategic value for parent corporations, thereby elucidating the symbiotic mechanisms and value co-creation pathways within China’s CVC ecosystem. Empirical analysis demonstrated that portfolio scale significantly enhances technological innovation outputs in portfolio enterprises, while simultaneously enabling parent companies to identify emerging technological trajectories that boost corporate innovation performance. Mechanism analysis revealed three operative channels: 1) technological linkage development, 2) failure tolerance mechanisms, and 3) relational network embeddedness. Heterogeneity tests further show amplified innovation spillovers when CVC institutions exhibit weaker professional capabilities, adopt solo-investment strategies, or involve government-affiliated lead investors. These findings substantiate the paradigm shift in CVC operations from short-term risk-return balancing toward long-term value creation alignment, will provide critical insights for fostering cross-scale enterprise collaboration and construct a dynamic innovation ecosystem through institutional innovations in capital allocation.
公司创业投资 / 投资组合规模 / 企业技术创新 / 企业共生 / 多元主体协同
corporate venture capital(CVC) / portfolio size / enterprise technological innovation / enterprise symbiosis / multi-agent collaboration
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New ventures often innovate by building on the technology of incumbent firms. The resulting technological links that form between new ventures and incumbents can open up valuable collaborative opportunities between them. Nonetheless, because these technological links also increase incumbents’ abilities to misappropriate the knowledge of new ventures, such collaboration can render new ventures particularly susceptible to the opportunistic whims of their incumbent partners. Whether technological links promote or impede corporate venture capital (CVC) deal formation may depend on incumbent firms’ propensities to behave opportunistically and how aware new ventures are of such propensities. We argue that when new ventures have social ties to incumbent firms that have opportunistic tendencies, technological links between them strongly impede CVC deal formation. In such cases, social ties substantiate new ventures’ fears of knowledge misappropriation that might occur. In contrast, when new ventures have social ties to incumbent firms that lack opportunistic tendencies, technological links between them strongly promote CVC deal formation as social ties validate the incumbent firm’s trustworthiness and the potential for productive collaboration as a result of technological links. Using a data set that integrates patent citations, hand-collected career histories, and infringement lawsuits, we tracked the investment pattern between 29 incumbents and 402 new ventures in the U.S. information technology industry and found support for our arguments.
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在创新创业生态系统中,公司创业投资(CVC)是一种促进大企业开放式创新和创业企业快速成长的有效机制。CVC活动在我国的20多年实践证明:其促进了大企业与创业企业的共同发展,并使二者形成共生关系,通过共生介质和共生界面优化实现双方互利共生。在创新生态系统视阈下,大企业种群与创业企业种群可通过演化博弈形成稳定的共生关系,有利于提高双方的适应性并拓宽生态位,进而协同共生进行价值创造。因此,基于对公司创业投资(CVC)生态群落生态位的描述,引入Lotka-Volterra模型,利用算例仿真预测大企业和创业企业的创新生态位演化趋势,从共生、学习、创新、激励角度提出公司创业投资生态群落的共生培育机制,为我国公司创业投资生态群落中企业创新生态位的策略优化与选择提供理论支持。
In the entrepreneurial ecosystem, corporate venture capital (CVC) is an effective mechanism to promote the open innovation of large enterprises and the rapid growth of start-up enterprises. CVC practice activities have been carried out in China for 20 years, which has promoted the common development of large enterprises and start-up enterprises, and formed a symbiotic relationship between them through the optimization of symbiotic media and symbiotic interface, mutual benefit and symbiosis, can be realized. From the perspective of innovation ecosystem, the stable symbiotic relationship between large enterprise population and entrepreneurial enterprise population can be formed through evolutionary game, which is conducive to improving the adaptability of both sides and broadening the niche, and then co-exist to create value. The niche of CVC ecological community was described and the innovation of CVC ecological community was analyzed through the introduction of Lotka-Volterra model. This paper analysis the stability of evolution game through Replicator Dynamic Equation, and then discusses ten parameters of niche state. The evolution trend of innovation niche of large enterprises and start-up enterprises is obtained through simulation examples. Finally, the symbiosis cultivation mechanism of the ecological community of venture capital is proposed from the perspective of symbiosis, learning, innovation and incentive mechanism. It provides theoretical support for strategy optimization and selection of enterprise innovation niche in China's CVC ecological community. The cultivation and evolution of CVC ecological community is based on the formation of symbiotic relationship. The professional advantages and abilities of large enterprises and start-ups are the basis of their participation in symbiosis. The complementarity among multiple subjects makes them interdependent. Based on the common goal and mutual trust among subjects, they form a close relationship and gradually evolve into a stable symbiotic relationship. CVC ecological community's pursuit of symbiotic interests is its instinctive motivation. Due to the complementarity of resources or knowledge, the integration of culture and the persistence of trust among symbiotic subjects, it can bring a variety of shared interests such as technological innovation, resource acquisition, cost reduction, risk control and scale benefits in the process of symbiosis. The niche evolution of CVC ecological community is affected by a variety of mechanisms. Competition and symbiosis are driven by interests and affected by ecological balance. Interest driven mechanism is the internal growth mechanism of CVC ecological community in a certain innovation and entrepreneurship ecological environment. The power source is the pursuit of maximizing individual interests by large enterprises and entrepreneurial enterprises. Large enterprise population and entrepreneurial enterprise population integrate relevant resources through horizontal symbiosis, vertical symbiosis or dynamic alliance, eliminate or reduce resource bottlenecks, and promote the smooth development of large enterprises and entrepreneurial enterprises. Therefore, as a core part of the innovation and entrepreneurship ecosystem, CVC ecological community shows a nonlinear and exponential growth trend. Only through effective symbiotic cultivation, symbiotic energy will be continuously generated and guide the circular development of new symbiotic relations in evolution. As an important mechanism in the entrepreneurial ecosystem, CVC ecological community symbiosis cultivation mechanism maintains the stability of symbiotic relationship through value co creation and distribution through adaptation, adjustment and aggregation among system populations, so as to promote the balance and healthy development of the ecosystem and the continuous improvement of the value of the whole innovation ecosystem.
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This paper investigates why industrial firms conduct Corporate Venture Capital (CVC) investment in entrepreneurial companies. I test alternative views on CVC by exploiting the entry, investment, and termination decisions of CVC divisions. CVC entry concentrates in firms that experience deteriorations of internal innovation. At the investment stage, CVCs select startups with a similar technological focus but that have a non-overlapping knowledge base, and they integrate technologies generated from these ventures that create strategic value. CVCs are terminated when parent firms’ innovation recovers. Overall, the strategic desire to fix innovation weaknesses after adverse shocks motivates firms to adopt CVCs.
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