基于演化博弈的科技向善协同驱动机制研究

阮荣彬, 朱祖平, 陈莞

科研管理 ›› 2026, Vol. 47 ›› Issue (6) : 88-100.

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科研管理 ›› 2026, Vol. 47 ›› Issue (6) : 88-100. DOI: 10.19571/j.cnki.1000-2995.2026.06.009  CSTR: 32148.14.kygl.2026.06.009

基于演化博弈的科技向善协同驱动机制研究

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Research on the collaborative driving mechanism of science and technology for social good based on evolutionary game

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摘要

驱动科技向善作为实现科技普惠、化解重大社会性议题以及赋能社会脆弱与特殊群体的关键行动,对回应利益相关群体诉求、改善民生福祉具有重要意义。本研究构建了消费者、企业与政府三方协同驱动科技向善的演化博弈模型,分析各博弈主体策略选择与博弈系统均衡点的稳定性,并运用Matlab 2024a进行数值仿真分析,考察关键参数变化下各主体行为策略演化路径。结果表明:在协同驱动科技向善过程中,三方博弈主体最终演化稳定策略是消费者参与科技向善、企业积极落实科技向善以及政府对科技向善进行严格治理;三方主体初始策略选择概率、政府奖惩、企业商业与声誉收益、消费者收益、三方主体损失等参数的不同取值会显著影响其行为策略的演化,即三方主体初始策略选择概率提高、政府奖惩强化、企业商业与声誉收益改善、消费者收益强化以及三方主体消极策略所引致损失的增大,均对演化系统达到理想的稳定状态产生作用。本研究丰富了协同驱动科技向善的机制探索,为推动消费者、企业与政府的策略选择朝积极方向演化提供理论与实践参考。

Abstract

As a key action to realize the benefits of science and technology, address major social issues, and empower vulnerable and special groups in society, driving science and technology for social good holds significant importance in responding to the demands of stakeholder groups and improving people’s well-being. This study constructed an evolutionary game model of consumers, enterprises and the government in collaborative driving science and technology for social good, analyzed the strategic choices of each game subject and the stability of the equilibrium point of the game system, and carried out the numerical simulation analysis by using Matlab 2024a, to investigate the evolutionary path of behavioral strategy of each subject in the context of changes of key parameters. As results shown, in the process of collaborative driving science and technology for social good, the final evolution of the three-party game subjects’ stable strategy is consumers’ participation in science and technology for social good, enterprises’ active implementation of science and technology for social good, and the government’s rigorous governance of science and technology for social good; different parameter values of the three-party subjects’ initial strategy selection probability, the government’s level of rewards and penalties, enterprises’ commercial and reputational gains, consumers’ gains, and the three-party subjects’ loss can significantly affect the behavioral strategy evolution. That is, the increase in the three-party subjects’ initial strategy selection probability, the reinforcement of the government’s level of rewards and penalties, the improvement of enterprises’ commercial and reputational gains, the enhancement of consumers’ gains, and the increase in the losses caused by the three-party subjects’ negative strategies all contribute to the evolutionary system reaching an ideal stable state. The study has enriched the exploration of mechanism for collaborative driving science and technology for social good and will provide theoretical and practical reference to the evolution of strategic choices of consumers, enterprises and the government in positive directions.

关键词

科技向善 / 多元主体 / 演化博弈 / 数值仿真

Key words

science and technology for social good / multi-agent / evolutionary game / numerical simulation

引用本文

导出引用
阮荣彬, 朱祖平, 陈莞. 基于演化博弈的科技向善协同驱动机制研究[J]. 科研管理. 2026, 47(6): 88-100 https://doi.org/10.19571/j.cnki.1000-2995.2026.06.009
Ruan Rongbin, Zhu Zuping, Chen Wan. Research on the collaborative driving mechanism of science and technology for social good based on evolutionary game[J]. Science Research Management. 2026, 47(6): 88-100 https://doi.org/10.19571/j.cnki.1000-2995.2026.06.009
中图分类号: F272.3   

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基金

国家社会科学基金一般项目:“驱动企业科技向善的内外治理机制研究”(21BGL274)
国家社会科学基金一般项目:“驱动企业科技向善的内外治理机制研究”(2021.09—2025.12)

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