环境监管对绿色创新增量提质的影响研究

麻丽娜; 陈宇含

doi:10.19571/j.cnki.1000-2995.2026.03.015

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科研管理 ›› 2026, Vol. 47 ›› Issue (3) : 146-155. DOI: 10.19571/j.cnki.1000-2995.2026.03.015 CSTR: 32148.14.kygl.2026.03.015

环境监管对绿色创新增量提质的影响研究

麻丽娜 ,
陈宇含

作者信息 +

Research on the impact of environmental supervision on the improvement of both quality and quantity of green innovation

Ma Lina ,
Chen Yuhan

Author information +

文章历史 +

摘要

环境监管是地方政府环境治理的重要组成部分，也是绿色创新关键驱动因素。本文基于2008—2018年中国120个主要城市A股上市公司面板数据，采用固定效应及调节效应模型考察晋升压力视角下地方政府环境监管与企业绿色创新的关系。研究发现：（1）地方政府环境监管并未促进企业绿色创新量质齐升，仅对绿色创新数量有显著促进作用，激发了企业策略性绿色创新；（2）晋升压力正向调节环境监管与绿色创新数量的关系，加剧了绿色创新“泡沫”现象；（3）环境监管对绿色创新数量的促进作用集中于重污染行业和东部地区，其对高城镇化地区绿色创新具有显著的增量提质效果，但晋升压力未发挥有效调节作用；（4）环境监管通过产业转移作用于绿色创新，并带来边界污染问题，而中央垂直监管有利于削弱绿色创新“泡沫”。本文深化了宏观政策与企业微观创新的研究范畴和边界条件，为现有研究提供新的视角和理论框架，为环境监管政策优化和企业绿色转型提供了有益启示和经验证据。

Abstract

Environmental supervision is an important part of government environmental governance and a key driving factor of green innovation. Based on the panel data of A-share listed companies in 120 major cities in China from 2008 to 2018，this paper examined the relationship between environmental supervision and corporate green innovation from the perspective of promotion pressure by using the fixed effect and moderating effect models. The study found that：（1） Environmental supervision only significantly promotes the quantity of corporate green innovation，rather than the quality，which induces the "bubble" phenomenon of green innovation；（2） The promotion pressure positively regulates the relationship between environmental supervision and the quantity of green innovation and enhances the "bubble" effect of environmental supervision；（3） The "bubble" phenomenon of green innovation caused by environmental supervision is concentrated in heavily polluting industries and eastern regions. It has a significant role in promoting the quality and quantity of green innovation in highly urbanized regions. However，the regulatory effect of promotion pressure is not effective；（4） Environmental supervision affects green innovation through industrial transfer，and causes neighboring areas to become "pollution havens". The central vertical supervision weakens the "bubble" phenomenon of green innovation. This paper has deepened the research scope and boundary conditions of macro-policy and micro-corporate innovation，which brings a new perspective and theoretical framework for existing research. It will also provide beneficial enlightenment and empirical evidence for optimizing environmental supervision policies and promoting corporate green transformation.

导出引用

麻丽娜, 陈宇含. 环境监管对绿色创新增量提质的影响研究[J]. 科研管理. 2026, 47(3): 146-155 https://doi.org/10.19571/j.cnki.1000-2995.2026.03.015

Ma Lina, Chen Yuhan. Research on the impact of environmental supervision on the improvement of both quality and quantity of green innovation[J]. Science Research Management. 2026, 47(3): 146-155 https://doi.org/10.19571/j.cnki.1000-2995.2026.03.015

中图分类号： D630.9；F273.1；F275.5

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