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科技领军企业牵头创新联合体持续突破关键核心技术的演化博弈研究
Research on the evolutionary game in which S&T leading enterprises lead the innovation consortium to make continuous breakthroughs in key core technologies
以企业主导的创新联合体推动科技创新与产业创新深度融合,是突破关键核心技术“卡脖子”问题、加快发展新质生产力的关键。本文基于演化博弈理论,运用Matlab软件对创新主体在不同参量变化下的策略选择进行仿真分析,揭示科技领军企业牵头创新联合体持续突破关键核心技术的动态演化规律。研究发现:(1)政府参与意愿是影响创新联合体成员合作的重要因素,且对科技领军企业的影响更加显著;提升科技领军企业的参与意愿,在一定程度上会影响成员单位的积极性,提升成员单位的参与意愿对政府和科技领军企业的策略选择几乎没有影响;(2)相比激励机制,合理的惩罚机制更能有效促进创新联合体各主体持续参与关键核心技术攻关的积极性;(3)科技成果转化收益对创新联合体持续参与关键核心技术攻关的积极性有显著影响,且对科技领军企业的影响更加突出;(4)当创新联合体各主体均选择积极策略时,科技领军企业参与意愿随着关键核心技术突破成功概率增加而增加;但仅有一方积极创新时,另一方不会选择积极创新,且政府不会选择高度参与支持的策略。最后,本文提出以下对策建议:加强有为政府、健全有效市场、培育有力主体、构建有容社会四位一体的协同体系,赋能科技领军企业牵头的创新联合体,激发多元主体创新活力,持续突破关键核心技术,培育新质生产力新动能。
Promoting the deep integration of S&T innovation and industrial innovation through an enterprise-led innovation consortium is the key to make breakthroughs in key core technologies and accelerate the development of new quality productive forces. Based on the evolutionary game theory,this paper used the Matlab software to simulate and analyze the strategy selection of innovation subjects under changes in different parameters,revealing the dynamic evolution law according to which the S&T leading enterprises lead innovation consortium to make continuous breakthroughs in key core technologies. The research found that: (1) The government's willingness of participation is a critical factor influencing the cooperation among the innovation consortium members,with a particularly significant impact on S&T leading enterprises;Enhancing the participation willingness of S&T leading enterprises can influence the enthusiasm of member units to some extent,while conversely,increasing the participation willingness of member units has a minimal effect on the strategic choices of the government and S&T leading enterprises;(2) Compared with the incentive mechanism,a reasonable punishment mechanism can more effectively promote the continued participation and enthusiasm of each member of the innovation consortium in key core technology research;(3) The income from the transformation of S&T achievements significantly impacts the enthusiasm of the innovation consortium members to continue participating in key core technology research,with a particularly pronounced effect on S&T leading enterprises;(4) When all the subjects of the innovation consortium adopt a positive strategy,the willingness of S&T leading enterprises to participate increases with the increase of the success probability of the key core technology breakthroughs. However,if only one party is actively innovating,the other party are unlikely to choose active innovation,and the government will not choose a strategy that is highly involved in support. Finally,this paper proposed the following countermeasures and suggestions: strengthening a well-functioning government,improving an efficient market,cultivating powerful subjects,and building a tolerant society within an integrated four-in-one collaborative system. These measures will empower the innovation consortium led by S&T leading enterprises,stimulate the innovation vitality of multiple subjects,achieve continuous breakthroughs in key core technologies,and cultivate new quality productive forces and new kinetic energy.
科技强国 / 新质生产力 / 科技领军企业 / 创新联合体 / 关键核心技术 / 演化博弈
S&T powerhouse / new quality productive forces / S&T leading enterprise / innovation consortium / key core technology / evolutionary game
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