科研管理

科研管理 ›› 2025, Vol. 46 ›› Issue (2): 119-128.DOI: 10.19571/j.cnki.1000-2995.2025.02.012

• 论文 • 上一篇    下一篇

创新投入目标设定、公司研发操纵与政府治理

叶云龙1，王红建2，顾署生3   

  1. 1.浙江万里学院商学院，浙江 宁波315100；
    2.江西财经大学金融学院，江西 南昌330013；
    3.江西财经大学会计学院，江西 南昌330013

  • 收稿日期:2023-07-16 修回日期:2024-10-09 出版日期:2025-02-20 发布日期:2025-02-11
  • 通讯作者: 顾署生
  • 基金资助:
    国家社会科学基金一般项目：“科创板注册制下IPO公司研发操纵行为及其治理研究”(22BGL040, 2022.09—2025.09)；江西省教育厅科学技术研究项目:“股东结盟行为与企业技术效率：影响、作用机制及对策“（GJJ2200510，2022.12—2025.12）。

Innovation input target setting, corporate R&D manipulation and government governance

Ye Yunlong1, Wang Hongjian2, Gu Shusheng3   

  1. 1. Business School, Zhejiang Wanli University, Ningbo 315100, Zhejiang, China;
    2. School of Finance, Jiangxi University of Finance and Economics, Nanchang 330013, Jiangxi, China;
    3. School of Accountancy, Jiangxi University of Finance and Economics, Nanchang 330013, Jiangxi, China

  • Received:2023-07-16 Revised:2024-10-09 Online:2025-02-20 Published:2025-02-11

摘要：     从研发操纵视角科学评估中国特色创新目标管理体制的实施效果，对创新驱动高质量发展意义重大。本文以“五年规划”作为准自然实验，探究创新投入目标设定对公司研发操纵的微观作用机理。研究发现：“五年规划”设定的创新投入目标扭曲激励了研发操纵，该结果经过系列稳健性和内生性处理后仍然成立。进一步检验发现：研发操纵公司的信贷资金规模更大、资金成本更低、政府补贴更多。异质性分析显示：公司所在地区的经济增长压力越高、创新投入目标管理动机越强以及国有企业，其研发操纵现象越明显。治理机制检验发现：数字化政府建设可以抑制创新投入目标设定的扭曲激励效应。上述结论拓展并深化了政府目标管理理论以及宏观制度特征下研发操纵动因理论的研究，也为政府治理优化路径提供了理论参考。

关键词: 创新投入目标设定, 五年规划, 研发操纵, 数字化政府

Abstract:       Evaluating the implementation of China′s unique innovation-target management system from the perspective of R&D manipulation is crucial for driving high-quality development. This paper used the Five-Year Plan as a quasi-natural experiment to explore the micro-mechanisms by which innovation investment targets influence corporate R&D manipulation. The study found that the innovation investment targets set by the Five-Year Plan distort incentives, thus leading to increased R&D manipulation. This result remains robust after a series of stability and endogeneity checks. Further examination revealed that companies engaged in R&D manipulation tend to have larger credit funds, lower funding costs, and receive more government subsidies. The heterogeneity analysis indicated that R&D manipulation is more pronounced in regions with higher economic growth pressure, stronger innovation investment target management motivations, and in state-owned enterprises. The governance mechanism test showed that the development of digital government can mitigate the distorting incentive effects of innovation investment target setting. These findings will expand and deepen the research on the government target management theory and the motives for R&D manipulation under macro-institutional characteristics, thus providing theoretical guidance for optimizing government governance.

Key words: innovation input target setting, five-year plan, R&D manipulation, digital government