从研发操纵视角科学评估中国特色创新目标管理体制的实施效果,对创新驱动高质量发展意义重大。本文以“五年规划”作为准自然实验,探究创新投入目标设定对公司研发操纵的微观作用机理。研究发现:“五年规划”设定的创新投入目标扭曲激励了研发操纵,该结果经过系列稳健性和内生性处理后仍然成立。进一步检验发现:研发操纵公司的信贷资金规模更大、资金成本更低、政府补贴更多。异质性分析显示:公司所在地区的经济增长压力越高、创新投入目标管理动机越强以及国有企业,其研发操纵现象越明显。治理机制检验发现:数字化政府建设可以抑制创新投入目标设定的扭曲激励效应。上述结论拓展并深化了政府目标管理理论以及宏观制度特征下研发操纵动因理论的研究,也为政府治理优化路径提供了理论参考。

Evaluating the implementation of China's unique innovation-target management system from the perspective of R&D manipulation is crucial for driving high-quality development. This paper used the Five-Year Plan as a quasi-natural experiment to explore the micro-mechanisms by which innovation investment targets influence corporate R&D manipulation. The study found that the innovation investment targets set by the Five-Year Plan distort incentives, thus leading to increased R&D manipulation. This result remains robust after a series of stability and endogeneity checks. Further examination revealed that companies engaged in R&D manipulation tend to have larger credit funds, lower funding costs, and receive more government subsidies. The heterogeneity analysis indicated that R&D manipulation is more pronounced in regions with higher economic growth pressure, stronger innovation investment target management motivations, and in state-owned enterprises. The governance mechanism test showed that the development of digital government can mitigate the distorting incentive effects of innovation investment target setting. These findings will expand and deepen the research on the government target management theory and the motives for R&D manipulation under macro-institutional characteristics, thus providing theoretical guidance for optimizing government governance.