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基于多主体博弈的区域军民科技协同创新生态系统演化研究
Research on the evolution of regional military-civil S&T collaborative innovation ecosystem based on the multi-agent game
区域军民科技协同创新是推动军民深度融合发展的必然选择,亦是践行创新驱动发展战略的现实需求。本研究基于创新生态系统视角,剖析了区域军民科技协同创新生态系统的特征和演化机理,构建了以军工企业、民口企业和地方政府为关键创新主体的演化博弈模型,并以黑龙江省为例开展了数值仿真。研究表明:(1)合理的成本分担情况下,即使地方政府不直接介入协同创新,两者仍会选择继续合作开展科技协同创新。(2)公平的利益分配有利于促进军民企业协作,利益分配极端失衡的情况下,政府倾向于直接介入协同创新以维持系统稳定。(3)地方政府是否进行财政补贴以及补贴力度强弱不会对军民企业协同创新演化方向产生根本性影响,但适当的财政补贴有利于促进系统正向演化。本研究基于创新生态视角进一步丰富了军民融合创新理论,为地方政府深化军民协同体制机制改革、推动军民融合深度发展提供了参考借鉴。
Regional military-civilian S&T collaborative innovation is the key point and breakthrough to implement the military-civilian integration development strategy and innovation-driven development strategy at the regional level, and is also an important measure to improve the overall efficiency of the national innovation system and drive regional innovation development. However, there are still problems in the current regional military civilian technology collaborative innovation, such as diverse innovation entities and their interest demands, unclear cost sharing and benefit distribution mechanisms. The innovation management paradigm from the traditional perspective has been unable to meet the practical needs of regional military-civilian S&T collaborative innovation development, and it is urgent to introduce an innovation ecological perspective to solve the obstacles of regional military-civilian S&T collaborative innovation.
Compared with previous innovation system theories, the innovation ecosystem theory uses stronger biological metaphors to carry out dynamic evolution analysis of the mechanism of action among various innovation agents, providing a more suitable analytical framework for solving the above problems. Therefore, introducing the theory of innovation ecosystem into the research of regional military-civilian S&T collaborative innovation and promoting the transition and evolution of the research paradigm of regional military-civilian S&T collaborative innovation from the conventional "innovation system" to "innovation ecosystem" is helpful to more deeply reveal the complex interaction between the main innovative subjects, elements and environment of military-civilian S&T collaborative innovation.
Regional collaborative innovation ecosystem of military and civilian S&T is a complex network system of interaction, symbiosis, competition and dynamic evolution formed to realize the continuous emergence of military and civilian S&T innovation and integrate regional superior resources. In addition to the common characteristics of innovation ecosystem such as systematicness, symbiosis, diversity, dynamics and self-organization, it also has the unique characteristics of limited openness, cooperative target diversification, coexistence of state-led and market regulation. The formation and evolution of the regional military-civilian S&T collaborative innovation ecosystem is a process that gradually breaks the constraints of time and space, from low-level innovation to high-level innovation, from the inefficient construction stage to the advanced maturity stage. The dynamics of system evolution come from the interaction and feedback loop between the innovation population, the innovation population and the external innovation environment. In the process of evolution, the innovative populations in the system maintain a symbiotic relationship of competition and cooperation. In other words, under the action of internal and external driving forces, repeated games will be played within and between innovative populations, and the game results will ultimately affect the evolution direction of the system.
Based on above research, this paper introduced the perspective of innovation ecosystem into the study of military-civilian S&T collaborative innovation, and analyzed the characteristics and evolution mechanism of regional military-civilian S&T collaborative innovation ecosystem. An evolutionary game model with military enterprise, private enterprise and local government as the key innovation subjects was constructed. Taking Heilongjiang Province as an example, the effects of benefit distribution, cost sharing and policy subsidies on the behavior of key innovation entities and system evolution were analyzed with numerical simulation. The results showed that: (1) In the case of reasonable cost sharing, even if the local government does not intervene in the military-civilian collaborative innovation, military and private enterprises will still choose to continue to cooperate in the collaborative innovation of S&T. The cost sharing coefficient has no significant influence on the strategy evolution direction of local governments. With the evolution and development of the system, local governments will eventually choose not to intervene in military-civilian collaborative innovation. (2) The fair distribution of benefits is conducive to promoting continued collaboration between military and private enterprises. In the case of unbalanced benefit distribution, the party with less benefit tends to choose the exit strategy, and the system evolution tends to disintegrate. When the distribution of benefits is extremely unbalanced, the government tends to take intervention strategies to maintain the stability of the system. (3) Whether or not local governments provide financial subsidies and how strong or weak the subsidies are will not have a fundamental impact on the evolution direction of the collaborative strategy between military and private enterprises. The sensitivity of private enterprises to financial subsidies is stronger than that of military enterprises, and appropriate financial subsidies are conducive to promoting the positive evolution of the system.
军民融合 / 军民科技协同创新 / 区域创新生态系统 / 演化博弈
military-civilian integration / military-civilian S&T collaborative innovation / regional innovation ecosystem / evolutionary game
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Based on the analysis of the overseas achievement of the theoretical research in innovation paradigm, the enterprise “innovation 3.0” model and the third generation innovation policy practice of multiple perspectives, the core feature of the new innovative 3.0 paradigms is innovation ecosystem. After all, we analyzed review of motivation on innovation ecosystem analysis, and then in-depth put forward the concept and characteristics of innovation ecosystems. In the present age, China will implement the strategy of innovation-driven development, and Scientific and technological innovation provides strategic support for raising the productive forces and boosting the overall national strength, we put forward some basic considerations of building the world's top innovation ecosystem.
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Government-industry-university-institute collaboration innovation is the great motivation to implement the innovation-driven strategy, promote development of national and regional economics. However, there are some drawbacks in the mechanism of collaborative innovation of industry-university-institute that is led by industry, such as the weakened effect of government-leading, the low motivation and efficiency of colleges and universities which participate in it. According to these shortages, the government is viewed as the main body of collaboration innovation and then the tripartite evolutionary game model about collaboration innovation, which is guided by government, is led by university and is with the participation of industry, is constructed. In order to figure out the game evolution strategies of government, industry and university in different situation, the strategy choices among the government, industry and university during the collaborative innovation process are analyzed. Providing the collaboration innovation center constructed by Jiangsu Province as a case, the factors that influence the strategy choices of government-industry-university-institute collaboration innovation are studied by simulation. The result reveals that the influence degree of government, industry and university's willingness is different from each other. The enterprises' behavior to participate in collaboration innovation is mostly likely to be influenced by the market behaviors. Instead, the colleges' behavior to attend collaboration innovation are more likely to be influenced by the willingness of government, and the enterprises are more sensitive to the college's willingness. Different government motivation mechanisms affect the enterprises and university respectively. The policy support of government is more attractive to the enterprises, and the financial support impacts the universities more. Moreover, the enterprise is more sensitive to the penalty and the income distribution. The enterprise takes the profit maximization as the goal, while the colleges aim at the scientific research achievement and developing the talents. And also the change of the penalty and interest distribution affects the enterprise behavior choices more. In this article, the government is taken as the behavior main body to analyze the collaboration innovation game with the enterprise and the college. And the study provides the reference significance to the tripartite evolutionary game model of government-industry-university-institute.
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如何促进军民合作技术创新是军民深度融合战略背景下军民双方亟需解决的重要问题。基于演化博弈的基本理论和方法,构建了包含民企、军企与政府在内的三方博弈模型,寻找出能使整个系统处于均衡状态的稳定策略,并利用数值仿真分析了政府支持不同方式对军民合作技术创新的影响。结果表明:在政府不同支持方式下,民企和军企相互促进,双方均向合作技术创新的方向演化,并最终保持稳定;随着时间的推进,政府最终均会选择退出支持,不同支持方式下退出速度不同;政府应对不同支持方式进行优化。
It is important for both military and civilian sides to promote the Military-Civil Cooperation Innovation in the context of military-civilian deep integration. The study builds a tripartite game model of private enterprises, military enterprises and government based on the basic theory and method of evolutionary game, finds out the stable strategy which can makethe whole system in equilibrium state and analysesthe influence of different parameters on the technological innovation of civil-military cooperation. The results showthat under the different support of government, private enterprises and military enterprises tend to achieve the stability of military-civil cooperation innovation through mutual beneficial interactions. With time, the government will eventually choose not to provide support, and different ways of support exit at different speeds;Government should optimize different ways of support.
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方炜, 王婵, 李正锋. 演化博弈视角下军民融合协同创新合作稳定性分析[J]. 运筹与管理, 2019, 28(9): 15-26.
协同创新是实施军民融合深度发展战略的重要基础和内在动力。军民融合协同创新跨越军地,针对军民融合协同创新的合作后续稳定性问题,基于演化博弈理论,构建了有限理性下以军工企业和民用企业为参与主体的协同创新演化博弈模型,分析系统长期演化的结果与影响合作稳定性的因素,并用Matlab进行数值仿真。研究表明,军民融合协同创新合作稳定性与双方合作收益、违约金、政府激励正相关,与基本收益、研发成本、信息沟通成本、技术二次转化成本、风险成本、背叛收益负相关,存在合理的收益分配系数有利于合作稳定性,同时给出了政府激励力度的基础标准。最后,为提高合作稳定性提出针对性建议。
Collaborative innovation is an important foundation and internal impetus for civil-military integration strategy. For exploring the stability of the collaborative innovation of civil-military integration across the military filed and, by using evolutionary game theory we set up the evolutionary game model for military and civilian firms based on the limited rationality. We analyze the long term evolutionary results and the factors that affect the stability, based on Matlab simulation. The results show that the stability analysis between the two sides of the game is positively related to the cooperation revenue, breach of contract and government incentives, and negatively related to the basic income, R&D cost, information communication cost, technical secondary conversion cost, risk cost & betrayal benefit. There is a reasonable distribution factor of revenue that contributes to the stability of cooperation, and we offer the basic standard of government incentives. At last, we come up with some pieces of practicable advice to boost the stability of process.
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卢艳秋, 廖爱红. 基于三方演化博弈的新创科技型企业集群网络嵌入机制研究[J]. 中国管理科学, 2022, 30(2): 276-286.
新创科技型企业嵌入集群网络既是企业快速成长的捷径，也是高技术产业集群提升竞争力的机会。本文构建了新创科技型企业、集群在位企业、政府三方演化博弈模型。分析了三方参与主体的演化稳定策略，并用数值仿真分析进一步验证了博弈结果。研究表明：演化稳定策略受成本、政府扶持力度，激励、惩罚以及各方初始参与意愿的影响；企业嵌入集群网络关注的是网络化优势带来的长久获益，而非单次合作获益；在结网初期，集群在位企业的参与比政府参与更有助于新创科技型企业成功嵌入集群网络；在结网后期，当新创科技型企业和集群在位企业参与意愿较高后，政府可以逐渐退出对企业结网行为的支持。
New technology-oriented enterprises’ embedding into cluster network is not only a shortcut for the rapid growth of enterprises, but also an opportunity to enhance the competitiveness of cluster network. The evolutionary game method is used to established the tripartite game model among new technology-oriented enterprises,enterprises already embedded in the cluster and government. The evolutionary stability strategy of the three participants is analyzed, and the results are further verified by numerical simulation analysis. The results show that the evolutionary stable strategy is influenced by the cost, the support from the government, the incentive value, the penalty value and the participants’ initial willingness to participate. Enterprises focuses on the long-term benefits brought by networking advantages rather than the benefits of a single collaboration. In the initial stage of forming cluster network, the participation of enterprises already embedded in the cluster is more conducive to the successful embedding of new technology-oriented enterprises than that of the government. In the later stage of forming cluster network, when enterprises’ willingness to participate is high, government can gradually withdraw its support for enterprises’ network establishment.
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