区域军民科技协同创新是推动军民深度融合发展的必然选择，亦是践行创新驱动发展战略的现实需求。本研究基于创新生态系统视角，剖析了区域军民科技协同创新生态系统的特征和演化机理，构建了以军工企业、民口企业和地方政府为关键创新主体的演化博弈模型，并以黑龙江省为例开展了数值仿真。研究表明：（1）合理的成本分担情况下，即使地方政府不直接介入协同创新，两者仍会选择继续合作开展科技协同创新。（2）公平的利益分配有利于促进军民企业协作，利益分配极端失衡的情况下，政府倾向于直接介入协同创新以维持系统稳定。（3）地方政府是否进行财政补贴以及补贴力度强弱不会对军民企业协同创新演化方向产生根本性影响，但适当的财政补贴有利于促进系统正向演化。本研究基于创新生态视角进一步丰富了军民融合创新理论，为地方政府深化军民协同体制机制改革、推动军民融合深度发展提供了参考借鉴。

Regional military-civilian S&T collaborative innovation is the key point and breakthrough to implement the military-civilian integration development strategy and innovation-driven development strategy at the regional level, and is also an important measure to improve the overall efficiency of the national innovation system and drive regional innovation development. However, there are still problems in the current regional military civilian technology collaborative innovation, such as diverse innovation entities and their interest demands, unclear cost sharing and benefit distribution mechanisms. The innovation management paradigm from the traditional perspective has been unable to meet the practical needs of regional military-civilian S&T collaborative innovation development, and it is urgent to introduce an innovation ecological perspective to solve the obstacles of regional military-civilian S&T collaborative innovation. Compared with previous innovation system theories, the innovation ecosystem theory uses stronger biological metaphors to carry out dynamic evolution analysis of the mechanism of action among various innovation agents, providing a more suitable analytical framework for solving the above problems. Therefore, introducing the theory of innovation ecosystem into the research of regional military-civilian S&T collaborative innovation and promoting the transition and evolution of the research paradigm of regional military-civilian S&T collaborative innovation from the conventional "innovation system" to "innovation ecosystem" is helpful to more deeply reveal the complex interaction between the main innovative subjects, elements and environment of military-civilian S&T collaborative innovation. Regional collaborative innovation ecosystem of military and civilian S&T is a complex network system of interaction, symbiosis, competition and dynamic evolution formed to realize the continuous emergence of military and civilian S&T innovation and integrate regional superior resources. In addition to the common characteristics of innovation ecosystem such as systematicness, symbiosis, diversity, dynamics and self-organization, it also has the unique characteristics of limited openness, cooperative target diversification, coexistence of state-led and market regulation. The formation and evolution of the regional military-civilian S&T collaborative innovation ecosystem is a process that gradually breaks the constraints of time and space, from low-level innovation to high-level innovation, from the inefficient construction stage to the advanced maturity stage. The dynamics of system evolution come from the interaction and feedback loop between the innovation population, the innovation population and the external innovation environment. In the process of evolution, the innovative populations in the system maintain a symbiotic relationship of competition and cooperation. In other words, under the action of internal and external driving forces, repeated games will be played within and between innovative populations, and the game results will ultimately affect the evolution direction of the system. Based on above research, this paper introduced the perspective of innovation ecosystem into the study of military-civilian S&T collaborative innovation, and analyzed the characteristics and evolution mechanism of regional military-civilian S&T collaborative innovation ecosystem. An evolutionary game model with military enterprise, private enterprise and local government as the key innovation subjects was constructed. Taking Heilongjiang Province as an example, the effects of benefit distribution, cost sharing and policy subsidies on the behavior of key innovation entities and system evolution were analyzed with numerical simulation. The results showed that: (1) In the case of reasonable cost sharing, even if the local government does not intervene in the military-civilian collaborative innovation, military and private enterprises will still choose to continue to cooperate in the collaborative innovation of S&T. The cost sharing coefficient has no significant influence on the strategy evolution direction of local governments. With the evolution and development of the system, local governments will eventually choose not to intervene in military-civilian collaborative innovation. (2) The fair distribution of benefits is conducive to promoting continued collaboration between military and private enterprises. In the case of unbalanced benefit distribution, the party with less benefit tends to choose the exit strategy, and the system evolution tends to disintegrate. When the distribution of benefits is extremely unbalanced, the government tends to take intervention strategies to maintain the stability of the system. (3) Whether or not local governments provide financial subsidies and how strong or weak the subsidies are will not have a fundamental impact on the evolution direction of the collaborative strategy between military and private enterprises. The sensitivity of private enterprises to financial subsidies is stronger than that of military enterprises, and appropriate financial subsidies are conducive to promoting the positive evolution of the system.