科研管理 ›› 2024, Vol. 45 ›› Issue (3): 171-182.DOI: 10.19571/j.cnki.1000-2995.2024.03.018

• 论文 • 上一篇    下一篇

机构投资者抱团对年报语调操纵的影响研究

黄小勇1,2,成忠厚2,凌智铭1,陈菁1   

  1. 1.江西师范大学财政金融学院,江西 南昌330022;
    2.江西师范大学管理科学与工程研究中心,江西 南昌330022
  • 收稿日期:2023-10-02 修回日期:2024-01-02 出版日期:2024-03-20 发布日期:2024-03-11
  • 通讯作者: 凌智铭
  • 基金资助:
    国家社会科学基金项目:“媒体报道与审计监督协同提升地方政府债务信息披露质量研究”(19CGL012)。

A study of the impact of institutional investor clique on annual report tone manipulation

Huang Xiaoyong1,2, Cheng Zhonghou2, Ling Zhiming1, Chen Jing1   

  1. 1. College of Finance, Jiangxi Normal University, Nanchang 330022, Jiangxi, China;
    2. Research Center of Management Science and Engineering, Jiangxi Normal University, Nanchang 330022, Jiangxi, China
  • Received:2023-10-02 Revised:2024-01-02 Online:2024-03-20 Published:2024-03-11

摘要:    机构投资者理性化抱团行为和企业规范化年报信息披露是影响资本市场整体稳定的关键因素,对资本市场高质量发展具有深远影响。本文基于2013—2020年深沪A股上市公司的样本数据,采用固定效应模型和两阶段最小二乘法,实证检验了机构投资者抱团对上市公司年报语调操纵的影响机制及效应。研究发现:(1)机构投资者抱团对年报语调操纵具有显著正向影响,表明机构投资者抱团会显著加剧年报语调操纵程度,稳健性检验结果依然支持该结论;(2)影响机制检验表明,当管理层迎合动机较强和机构投资者团体“用脚投票”时,机构投资者抱团会进一步加剧年报语调操纵程度;(3)异质性检验表明,对于监管相对较弱的企业,管理层更有可能为了迎合机构投资者团体而进行年报语调操纵;(4)影响效应检验表明,机构投资者抱团情况下,年报语调操纵行为会显著提高股价崩盘风险,从而阻碍了资本市场的高质量发展。本文研究结果从理论层面为分析年报语调操纵的影响机制提供了多元化视角,从实践层面为规范机构投资者抱团行为、提升企业信息披露水平以及助力资本市场高质量发展提供了政策启示。

关键词: 机构投资者抱团, 年报语调操纵, 股价崩盘风险, 资本市场效应

Abstract:     Rationalized clique behavior of institutional investors and standardized annual report disclosure of enterprises are the key factors affecting the overall stability of the capital market, which have far-reaching impacts on the high-quality development of the capital market. Based on the sample data of the A-share listed companies in Shenzhen and Shanghai from 2013 to 2020, this paper empirically examined the mechanism and effects of institutional investor clique on the tone manipulation of listed companies′ annual reports using the fixed-effects model and the two-stage least squares method. It was found that: (1) Institutional investor clique has a significant positive effect on the annual report tone manipulation, indicating that institutional investor clique significantly exacerbates the degree of annual report tone manipulation, and the results of the robustness test still support the conclusion; (2) The test of the impact mechanism showed that when the management pandering motivation is stronger and the institutional investor groups "vote with their feet", institutional investor clique will further exacerbate the degree of annual report tone manipulation; (3) The heterogeneity test showed that for firms with relatively weak regulation, management is more likely to manipulate the tone of annual reports in order to cater to institutional investor clique; (4) The impact effect test showed that, in the case of institutional investor clique, the tone of annual report manipulation significantly raises the risk of stock price collapse, thus impeding the high-quality development of the capital market. The findings of this paper will provide a diversified perspective for analyzing the influence mechanism of tone manipulation in annual reports at the theoretical level, and provide policy insights for regulating institutional investor clique behaviors, enhancing corporate disclosure, and contributing to the high-quality development of the capital market at the practical level.

Key words: institutional investor clique, annual report tone manipulation, share price crash risk, capital market effect