股权激励与股利政策稳定性研究——基于非效率投资的遮掩效应

摘要/Abstract

摘要： 本文以企业非效率投资值量化高管寻租水平，研究了股权激励对现金股利政策稳定性的影响，并探析了非效率投资在股权激励影响股利政策稳定性中的作用机制。基于代理成本理论、股利信号理论，结合我国股利政策研究现状，将股东普遍关注的现金股利政策稳定性作为股权激励效果评价的参数，选取2006—2015年A股上市公司数据，利用自由模型非参数法测定股利政策稳定性水平，借助残差分析法测算非效率投资水平，通过面板回归和层次分析法得出了以下结论：（1）股权激励后非效率投资水平增强且股利政策稳定性下降，因而股权激励不一定会发挥正效应；（2）非效率投资水平与股利政策稳定性负相关，即低效率投资减少企业自由现金流量，进而导致企业股利政策波动增强；（3）非效率投资在股权激励对股利政策稳定性的影响中，并非起到“中介作用”，而是遮掩了股权激励后股利政策稳定性的下降程度，成了高管寻租时的一个面具。论文据此提出以下对策建议：(1)客观看待股利平稳性指标,完善股权激励效果评价指标体系；(2)建立健全企业投资效率监督体系，长短期监控相结合；(3)优化上市公司股权激励方案设计，动态调整期权与股票授予比例。

关键词: 股权激励, 高管谋私, 非效率投资, 股利平稳性

Abstract:

This paper quantifies the rent-seeking level of executives by the inefficient investment value of enterprises. Then it studies the impact of equity incentives on the stability of cash dividend policy. Furthermore, the mechanism of non-efficiency investment in equity incentive affecting the stability of cash dividend policy is also discussed. The theoretical basis of this article is the theory of agency cost and dividend signal theory. Through market research, we find that the stability of dividend policy is a topic of concern to shareholders. Besides, combined with the research status of China′s cash dividend policy, we find that the stability of cash dividend policy is much more suitable than other indexes to be taken as the parameter of equity incentive effect evaluation.

In this paper, data of A-share listed companies that implemented equity incentive from 2006 to 2015 are selected from CCER and CSMAR databases. The free model nonparametric method found by Richardson determines the level of stability of dividend policy to replace the level of executive rent-seeking. Compared with other methods used by researchers in theory, we find that the residual analysis method is the most scientific method to measure the level of inefficient investment. The main analysis methods of this paper are panel regression and analytic hierarchy process method.

By analyzing the regression results, we come to the following conclusions: (1) The level of inefficient investment increases after the implementation of the equity incentive policy. The stability of cash dividend policy declines since the executives got share options. According to these conclusions, we find that equity incentives may not play a positive effect which is not considered as other researchers. (2) The level of inefficient investment is negatively related to the stability of dividend policy. The other explain of this conclusion is that low-efficiency investment reduces corporate′s free cash flow, which in turn leads to increased volatility of corporate cash dividend policy. (3) Inefficient investment in the impact of equity incentives on the stability of cash dividend policy, it does not play an "intermediary role" to reduce the stability of cash dividend. The result shows that inefficient investment hides the degree of decline in the stability of dividend policy after executives getting equity incentives, and becomes a mask for executives to seek rent.

Based on this, the paper puts forward three countermeasures and suggestions：Firstly, we should take an objective view of the cash dividend stability index, so we need to improve the equity incentive effect evaluation index system. Secondly, listed companies ought to establish and improve the supervision system of enterprise investment efficiency due to the existence of executive rent-seeking. Besides, the best way to improve the investment efficiency of enterprises is to set up a long-term and short-term investment evaluation system. In the end, we need to optimize the equity incentive scheme design of listed companies. According to the characteristics of options and restricted stock, the executive incentive grant proportion should be adjusted dynamically.

Key words: stock option, executive rent-seeking, inefficient investment, cash dividend smoothing

唐建荣, 王宁, 周玮. 股权激励与股利政策稳定性研究——基于非效率投资的遮掩效应[J]. 科研管理, 2021, 42(2): 190-199.

Tang Jianrong, Wang Ning, Zhou Wei. Research on stock option and cash dividend smoothing——Based on the suppressing effects of Inefficient Investment[J]. Science Research Management, 2021, 42(2): 190-199.

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