科研管理

科研管理 ›› 2016, Vol. 37 ›› Issue (4): 16-26.

• 论文 • 上一篇    下一篇

国有企业债务结构对创新的影响—是否存在债务融资滥用的经验检验

陈岩1，张斌1,2，翟瑞瑞1   

  1. 1.北京邮电大学经济管理学院，北京100876；
    2.河南财经政法大学工商管理学院，河南 郑州450046
  • 出版日期:2016-04-20 发布日期:2016-04-13
  • 基金资助:

    中国科学技术部国际合作司“中外创新对话专项”研究重大课题，“中美两国贸易和外资政策及实践对创新活动的影响研究”以及国家自然科学基金面上项目（71273035、71073087、71573023）。

Impact of debt structure of state-owned enterprises on innovation—An empirical test of abuse of debt financing

Chen Yan1， Zhang Bin1,2， Zhai Ruirui1   

  • Online:2016-04-20 Published:2016-04-13

摘要： 论文嵌入中国情境，利用3SLS方法探究中国制造业国有企业债务结构如何影响企业的创新投入和创新产出。由实证结果发现，国有流动债务负向影响创新投入，正向影响创新产出；然而，长期债务负向影响创新产出，对创新投入的影响并不明显。国有企业高投入、低效率的创新现状表明，委托代理冲突是国有企业代理问题的主要矛盾。从创新效率的角度来看，适度地提高流动债务比例、降低长期债务比例，有助于降低代理成本，提高创新绩效。

关键词: 债务结构, 创新, 国有企业, 委托代理冲突, 所有者冲突

Abstract: By embedding in the Chinese context, this paper studies the influence of debt structure on input and output of innovation. Using a sample of state-owned enterprises (SOEs) of Chinese manufacturing during 2005-2007, we examine the relationship between debt structure and innovation input and output with the 3SLS method. The results show that floating debt is negatively related to innovation input, but positively related to innovation output. On the contrary, long-term debt has no relation with innovation input, but negatively related to innovation output. The innovation of high investment and low efficiency of the state-owned enterprises shows that the principal-agent conflicts are the main contradiction of the state-owned enterprises’ agency problem. From the point of view of innovation efficiency, increasing the ratio of high floating debt and reducing the ratio of long-term debt in the financing structure, the risk of debt abuse can be cut down and the innovation performance can be improved.

Key words: debt structure, innovation, state-owned enterprises, principal-agent conflicts, owner conflicts, principal-agent conflicts, owner conflicts