基于相互套牢的创业企业控制权最优配置研究

科研管理 ›› 2015, Vol. 36 ›› Issue (4): 39-47.

基于相互套牢的创业企业控制权最优配置研究

党兴华¹, 韩瑾^1,2, 陈敏灵³

1. 西安理工大学经济与管理学院, 陕西西安 710048;
2. 西安财经学院商学院, 陕西西安 710100;
3. 西安石油大学经济管理学院, 陕西西安 710065

收稿日期:2013-03-14 修回日期:2014-10-17 出版日期:2015-04-25 发布日期:2015-04-18
作者简介:党兴华(1952-),男(汉),陕西人,西安理工大学经济与管理学院教授,博士生导师,研究方向:风险投资与创业管理。
韩瑾(1979-),女(汉),河北人,西安理工大学经济与管理学院,博士生,西安财经学院商学院教师,研究方向:风险投资与契约设计。
陈敏灵(1975-),男(汉),重庆人,西安石油大学经济管理学院,副教授,博士,研究方向:风险投资与创业管理。
基金资助:
国家自然科学基金项目(71172201),起止时间:2012.01.01-2015.12.31;国家教育部博士点基金项目(20106118110012),起止时间:2011.01.01-2013.12.31;陕西省软科学研究计划项目(2013KRM14),起止时间:2013.01-2014.12;陕西省社会科学基金项目(2014P13),起止时间:2014.07-2016.12;陕西省教育厅专项科研计划项目(2014JK1556),起止时间:2014.01-2015.12。

Optimal allocation of control rights based on hold-up to each other

Dang Xinghua¹, HanJin^1,2, Chen Minling³

1. School of Economics and Management, Xi'an University of Technology, Xi'an 710048, Shaanxi, China;
2. School of Business, Xi'an University of Finance and Economics, Xi'an 710100, Shaanxi, China;
3. School of Economics and Management, Xi'an Shiyou University, Xi'an 710065, Shaanxi, China

Received:2013-03-14 Revised:2014-10-17 Online:2015-04-25 Published:2015-04-18

摘要/Abstract

摘要： 本文以不完全契约为基础,在金融契约和控制权配置理论的框架内,从缓解企业家与投资家相互套牢问题的角度,在扩展企业家风险偏好、假设企业状态变量不可证实的基础上,通过引入企业家事前努力水平、企业家与投资家讨价还价能力、企业中期绩效信号、投资家投资额、管理监督成本、项目清算价值等变量,建立了创业企业控制权动态配置模型,通过比较不同控制权配置方式下的双方收益与企业价值,确定控制权最优配置,研究表明:相机控制与投资家控制交替实现控制权最优配置;当企业家讨价还价能力较强时,或较弱时,如果绩效信号较低,投资家控制最优,企业价值不会随之变化;当企业家讨价还价能力较弱并低于临界值,如果绩效信号较高,相机控制最优,反之投资家控制最优,企业价值随之发生相应变化。

关键词: 不完全契约, 套牢, 再谈判, 控制权

Abstract: Based on incomplete contract, from the angle of relieving investor and entrepreneur hold up the other party, based on extending the risk preferences of entrepreneur and assuming firm's state variable, by introducing the entrepreneur's ex ante effort, entrepreneur and investor's bargaining power, firm's interim performance signal, investor's investment, manage and monitor cost, project's liquidation values, etc., the paper builds up the model of dynamic control rights allocation in VC-backed firms, by comparing the investor and entrepreneur's payoffs and firm's value of different control rights allocation, to determine the optimal control rights allocation. The results of research show that, investor control and contingent control alternate to realize the optimal control rights allocation: when the entrepreneur's bargaining power is stronger or lower, and if the firm's performance signal is lower, the investor control allocation can be optimal, and the firm's value does not change; when the entrepreneur's bargaining power is lower and is lower than the threshold, and if the firm's performance signal is higher, the contingent control allocation can be optimal, otherwise the investor control allocation can be optimal, the firm's value changes according to the change of each variable.

Key words: incomplete contracts, hold-up, renegotiation, control rights

中图分类号:

F830.59

党兴华, 韩瑾, 陈敏灵. 基于相互套牢的创业企业控制权最优配置研究[J]. 科研管理, 2015, 36(4): 39-47.

Dang Xinghua, HanJin, Chen Minling. Optimal allocation of control rights based on hold-up to each other[J]. Science Research Management, 2015, 36(4): 39-47.

参考文献

[1] Schmitz,P.W.The hold-up problem and incomplete contracts:A survey of recent topics in contract theory[J].Bulletin of Economic Research,2001,53(1):1-17. [2] Aghion P,Bolton P.An incomplete contracts approach to financial contracting[J].Review of Economic Studies,1992,59(3):473-455. [3] Grossman S,Hart O.The costs and benefits of ownership:A theory of vertical and lateral integration[J].Journal of Political Economy,1986,94(4):691-719. [4] Hart O,Moore J.Property rights and nature of the firm[J].Journal of Political Economy,1990,98(6):1119-1158. [5] Chan Y S,Siegal D,Thakor A V.Learning,corporate control and performance requirements in venture capital contracts [J].Intimation Economic Review,1990,31(2):365-381. [6] Bergl of E.A control theory of venture capital finance[J].The Journal of Law Economics and Organization,1994,10(2):247-267. [7] Hart O.Financial contracting[J].Journal of Economic Literature,2001,39(4):1079-1100. [8] A.A.Kirilenko.Valuation and control in venture finance[J].Journal of Finance,2001,56(2):565-587. [9] Vauhkonen.Financial contracts and contingent control rights[R].Working Paper,May,2003,SSRN:http://ssrn.com/abstract=438501. [10] Jean etienne de bettignies.Financing the entrepreneurial venture [J].Management Science,2008,54(1):151-166. [11] Brian Broughman,Jesse Frie.Renegotiation of cash flow rights in the sale of VC-backed firms [J].Journal of Financial Economics,2010,95(3):384-399. [12] Guillaume Andrieu.Optimal allocation of control rights in venture capital contracts[R].Working Paper,May,2011,SSRN:http://ssrn.com/abstract=1833417. [13] 尹哲.基于不同成长阶段的我国中小企业控制权转移问题研究[D].湖南:中南大学,2008.Yin Zhe.Research on the corporate controlling rights of China's SMEs by the growing stages[D].Hunan:Central South University,2008. [14] Vijay Yerramilli.Joint control and redemption rights in venture capital contracts [R].Working Paper,December,2006,SSRN:http://ssrn.com/abstract=967323. [15] 王雷,党兴华,贺利平.基于不完全契约的高新技术风险企业控制权结构选择及其影响因素研究[J].中国管理科学,2009,17(5):166-174.Wang Lei,Dang Xing Hua,He Li Ping.Research on the selection and the influencing factors of control rights structure in venture capital backed new high-tech firms based on incomplete contract[J].Chinese Journal of Management Science,2009,17(5):166-174. [16] 李金龙,李勇昭,李电生.创业投资中名义与实际控制权的转移[J].哈尔滨工业大学学报,2009,8(41):175-178.Li Jin Long,Li Yong Zhao,Li Dian Sheng.Transfer of formal control and real control in venture capital[J].Journal of Harbin Institute of Technology,2009,8(41):175-178. [17] 王声凑,曾勇.现金流权不一致、利益冲突与控制权阶段转移[J].管理科学学报,2010,13(9):76-86. Wang Sheng Cou,Zeng Yong.Inconsistent cash flow rights,conflicts of benefit and transfer of control rights in stage[J].Journal of Management Sciences in China,2010,13(9):76-86. [18] Yunfei Li,Zongfang Zhou.Research on the allocation of cash flow rights and control rights in venture capital financing contract[J].Modern Economy,2012,3(1):54-60. [19] Hellman T.IPO's,Acquisitions and the use of convertible securities in venture capital [J].Journal of Financial Economics,2006,81(3):649-679. [20] Patrick W.Schmitz.Incomplete contracts,the hold-up problem,and asymmetric information[J].Economics Letters,2008,99(1):119-122. [21] 殷林森.双边道德风险、股权契约安排与相机谈判契约[J].管理评论,2010,22(8):10-18.Yin Lin Sen.Double moral hazard,equity contract designing,and contingent negotiation contract[J].Management Review,2010,22(8):10-18. [22] Brian Broughman U.C.Berkeley.Independent directors and board control in venture finance[C].American Law & Economics Association Annual Meetings,May,2008. [23] Carsten Bienz,Uwe Walz.Venture capital exit rights[J].Journal of Economics& Managemen,2010,19(4):1071-1116. [24] Carsten Bienz,Julia Hirsch.The dynamics of venture capital contracts[J].Review of Finance,2012,16(1):157-195. [25] 燕志雄,费方域.企业融资中的控制权安排与企业家的激励[J].经济研究,2007(2):111-123.Yan Zhi Xiong,Fei Fang Yu.Control allocation in firm financings and entrepreneurp's incentive[J].Economic Research Journal,2007(2):111-123. [26] 朱心来.科技创业企业控制权分配的经验分析[J].经济经纬,2008(5):86-88.Zhu Xin Lai.The experience analysis of the control power distribution in venture capital backed high-tech firms[J].Economic Survey,2008(5):86-88. [27] 许艳芳.私募资本、不完全合约与控制权配置——基于蒙牛乳业的案例研究[J].经济理论与经济管理,2010(4):68-73.Xu Yan Fang.Private equity,incomplete contracts and allocation of control rights-a case study based on Mengniu dairy[J].Economic Theory and Business Management,2010(4):68-73.