科研成果在职称晋升中的信号与甄别作用研究

科研管理 ›› 2013, Vol. 34 ›› Issue (11): 114-123.

科研成果在职称晋升中的信号与甄别作用研究

李容

西南大学经济管理学院, 重庆 400715

收稿日期:2011-08-30 修回日期:2012-04-24 出版日期:2013-11-27 发布日期:2013-11-13
基金资助:
国家自然科学基金资助项目(70473075)"我国公共农业科研机构激励理论与管理制度创新研究",起止时间:2004-1~2008-12。

Studies on Signaling and screening functions of S&T research performancein academic promotion decision

Li Rong

College of Economics and Management, Southwest University, Chongqing 400715, China

Received:2011-08-30 Revised:2012-04-24 Online:2013-11-27 Published:2013-11-13

摘要/Abstract

摘要： 在学术水平不可验证的背景下,以科研成果的数量作为主要绩效依据的职称晋升能否有效分离不同学术水平的科学家并促进学术创新是学术评价制度有效性的一个重要体现。本文基于信息不对称理论的研究框架分析了科研成果的不可验证特征对职称晋升的影响。在此基础上,本文以1338名公共农业科研机构科学家为样本并利用信号理论和probit模型对职称晋升中科研成果的数量能否区分学术水平和学术创新努力不同的科学家进行了证实。理论分析与计量经济学研究结果表明:不可验证性使科研成果的学术水平不适合作为职称晋升的依据;在我国现行职称晋升制度下,科研成果的数量主要是科学家能否晋升职称的信号而非甄别其学术水平和学术创新性的有效方式。

关键词: 职称晋升, 科研成果, 信号作用, 甄别作用

Abstract: With the unverifiable setting of academic quality, whether or not scientists with different academic quality of research performance can be separated efficiently and academic innovation is promoted by performance-based academic promotion is an important reflection of the validity of the academic evaluation system. Based on the theory of information asymmetry, this paper analyzes the effect of unverifiable characteristics of research performance on the academic promotion decision. Furthermore, using framework of signaling theory as well as probit model, the author investigates the effectiveness of research performance to screen scientists with different academic ability and intrinsic motivation of innovation by sampling senior faculty members from public agricultural research institutions. The results of both theoretical and econometrical research show that academic quality of research performance does not fit the criteria considered in the promotion due to its unverifiability; research performance is no more than the scientists' signal of being promoted instead of the references to their academic ability and intrinsic motivation of innovation for underlying academic promotion systems in our country.

Key words: academic promotion, academic performance, signaling, screening

中图分类号:

G311
F062.3

李容. 科研成果在职称晋升中的信号与甄别作用研究[J]. 科研管理, 2013, 34(11): 114-123.

Li Rong. Studies on Signaling and screening functions of S&T research performancein academic promotion decision[J]. Science Research Management, 2013, 34(11): 114-123.

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