知识产权保护宽度是激励创新企业开展研发投资的主要政策工具,它通过影响知识产权的盈利能力与获取成本,作用于研发企业和受让企业之间的知识产权交易。构建一个两企业、能力非对称的多阶段博弈模型,进行一般均衡分析,结果表明:只有在研发企业的投资支出达到一定规模后,增加保护宽度,才能提高企业收益,激励企业增加研发投资。在既定研发投资下,保护宽度的边际增加将提高技术转让成本,降低受让企业收益和社会福利水平;这一负面效果只有在实现研发投资扩张效应后,才能减缓。因此在增加保护宽度的同时,需要引入辅助措施,如对企业的研发投资采取税收优惠政策、促进企业间知识产权交易等加以协调。

The protection scope of IPR is the primary policy tool for stimulating innovative enterprises to invest in R&D. It exerts an influence on the IPR transaction between transferor and transferee enterprises by affecting the acquisition cost and profitability of IPR. A multi-stage game model of two enterprises with asymmetrical abilities is built and general balanced analysis is conducted. Results show that expanding protection scope of IPR is able to raise enterprise income and stimulate enterprises to invest more on R&D only if the initial R&D investment reaches at a certain scale. Under the established R&D investment, expanding IPR protection scope margin would increase the cost of technology transfer, boosting profit for the transferor, meanwhile decreasing profit for the transferee and bringing the negative influence on social welfare. The negative side effect would be mitigated only after the distensible effect of R&D investment is achieved. Therefore, while expanding the protection scope of IPR, the auxiliary measures, such as preferential taxation policy for enterprise R&D investment and IPR trade promotion among enterprises, should also be introduced.