本文通过分析排污税、拍卖的排污许可和可交易的排污许可这三种环境规制措施对企业绿色技术创新的影响发现,企业减排的主要影响因素是绿色技术创新能力和环境规制的严厉程度;企业污染谎报问题的主要影响因素是环境规制的严厉程度和政府监管力度,而与企业绿色技术创新能力无关。通过对不同环境规制的比较分析发现,排污税率和排污许可价格与企业绿色技术创新的激励程度都成正相关;在对企业绿色技术创新的激励程度上,若政府不控制可交易排污许可的数量,则排污税和拍卖的排污许可具有同等的政策效果,而可交易排污许可的政策效果最弱;若政府能对可交易排污许可数量进行有效控制,则三种环境规制措施具有同等的政策效果。
Abstract
Based on the analysis of the effects of emission tax, auction emission permit, and tradable emission permit on enterprise green technology innovation, following conclusions are obtained: The major influential factors of enterprise abatement are green technology innovation ability and the rigorousness of environmental regulations. The major influential factors of enterprise violations are the rigorousness of environmental regulations and government monitoring force, and have nothing to do with the enterprise green technology innovation ability. Through the comparative analysis on different environmental regulations, it is found that both emission tax rate and emission permit price are positive related with incentives to enterprise green technology innovation; From the perspective of the incentives, both emission tax and auction emission permit will have the same policy effects, while tradable emission permit will have the weakest policy effects on enterprise green technology innovation, if the government does not control the quantity of tradable emission permit. These three environmental regulations will have the same policy effects on enterprise green technology innovation if the government effectively controls the quantity of tradable emission permit.
关键词
减排 /
绿色技术 /
环境规制 /
比较分析
Key words
abatement /
green technology /
environmental regulation /
comparative analysis
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基金
国家社科基金青年项目"完善节能减排长效机制的环境政策研究"(编号:10CJY028)起止时间2010.7-2012.12;国家自然科学基金面上项目"资源型城市产业转型研究:基于城市能力驱动的视角"(编号:70973121)起止时间2010.1-2013.12;徐州师范大学人文社科基金重点项目"环境管制与企业绿色创新"(编号:09XWA14)起止时间2009.12-2011.12;江苏省创新工程项目"我国碳减排的影响因素与目标实现政策研究"(编号:CXZZ11-0319)起止时间2010.1-2012.12。
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