本文在促销努力影响市场需求和具有生产不确定的VMI供应链下,先后分析了集中和分散控制下供应商和销售商的决策问题,讨论了生产不确定对供应商潜在成本和决策的影响,并建立了销量回扣和回购相结合的契约模型。在此基础上,分析了契约对销售商、供应商决策以及整体供应链收益的影响,研究表明契约能够促使销售商增加促销努力和订货量,供应商增加计划生产量,从而改善供应链的收益,并提出了进一步实现供应链最优收益水平的途径。最后,通过数值分析验证了本文的结论。
Abstract
With the supply chain of Vendor Managed Inventory(VMI) model which was characterized by random yield and the effect of stochastic promotion effort on market demand, the decision-making of the supplier and retailer under both centralized-control and decentralized-control were analyzed, the affect of random yield on the potential cost and decision-making of supplier was discussed, the contract model combined sales rebate with buy-back was built. On this basis, the affect of contract on retailer and supplier's decision-making and the revenue of the whole supply chain were analyzed. The research shows that the contract is able to urge retailer to increase the promotion effort and order quantity, which is also able to urge supplier to increase the planned production quantity, and this could improve the revenue of the supply chain. Furthermore, the way to realize the best income for the supply chain is proposed. Finally, the result is validated by the numerical analysis.
关键词
供应商管理库存 /
促销努力 /
生产不确定 /
销量回扣 /
回购 /
契约
Key words
VMI /
promotion effort /
random yield /
sales rebate /
buy back /
contract
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参考文献
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基金
国家自然科学基金:"中国港口投资优化决策理论及风险预警研究",项目编号:70873014,起止时间:2009.1-2011.11。
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