科研管理 ›› 2024, Vol. 45 ›› Issue (9): 166-174.DOI: 10.19571/j.cnki.1000-2995.2024.09.017

• 论文 • 上一篇    下一篇

巡视监督对区域创新的影响及作用机制研究

刘追,余清泉   

  1. 石河子大学经济与管理学院,新疆 石河子832000
  • 收稿日期:2023-06-29 修回日期:2023-09-14 出版日期:2024-09-20 发布日期:2024-09-10
  • 通讯作者: 余清泉
  • 基金资助:
    国家社会科学基金西部项目:“国家治理现代化背景下我国国有企业技术创新研究”(21XJY020,2021.09—2024.09)。

A study of the impact and action mechanism of supervision through inspection on regional innovation

Liu Zhui, Yu Qingquan   

  1. School of Economics and Management, Shihezi University, Shihezi 832000, Xinjiang, China
  • Received:2023-06-29 Revised:2023-09-14 Online:2024-09-20 Published:2024-09-10

摘要:     区域创新不仅受到经济、社会、自然等因素影响,还会受到政府行为及各类制度的影响。为了探讨巡视监督制度对区域创新的影响及作用机制,基于中纪委巡视的准自然实验,以2007—2020年我国31个省(自治区、直辖市)为研究对象,构建了多时点双重差分模型进行检验。研究发现:巡视监督对区域创新具有显著的促进作用,且具有跨期异质性,长期效果优于短期效果,结论经过一系列稳健性检验后依旧成立;作用机制研究发现:研发投入在巡视监督与区域创新之间具有遮掩效应,巡视监督减少了研发投入的“量”,提高了研发投入的“质”,通过有效的外部监督,提高了研发投入资金的使用效率,从而促进区域创新水平的提升;巡视监督对区域创新的影响存在地区异质性,对西部地区显著,对中部和东部地区不显著。以上结论丰富了巡视监督宏观经济后果和区域创新影响因素的研究体系,为加强党的领导和加快进入创新型国家前列提供了理论参考与经验证据。

关键词: 巡视监督, 区域创新, 研发投入, 遮掩效应

Abstract:     Regional innovation is not only affected by economic, social and natural factors, but also by government behavior and various institutions. In order to explore the impact and action mechanism of the supervision through inspection system on regional innovation, a multi-temporal double-difference model is constructed to test the 31 provincial-level regions in China from 2007 to 2020 selected as the research object, based on the quasi-natural experiment of inspection by the Central Commission for Discipline Inspection (CCDI). The study found that supervision through inspection has a significant promotion effect on regional innovation, and it also has a cross-period heterogeneity effect, but the long-term effect is better than the short-term effect, and the conclusion still holds after a series of robustness tests. The study on the action mechanism found that R&D investment has a masking effect between supervision through inspection and regional innovation, and that supervision through inspection reduces the quantity of R&D investment and improves the quality of R&D investment, and the quantity of R&D investment is increased. Moreover, through effective external supervision, the utilization efficiency of R&D investment is improved, thus promoting the improvement of the regional innovation level. The impact of supervision through inspection on regional innovation is regionally heterogeneous, and it is significant for the western region, but not significant for the central and eastern regions. The above conclusions have enriched the research system on the macroeconomic consequences of supervision through inspection and the factors influencing regional innovation, and they will provide reliable theoretical references and empirical evidence for strengthening the Communist Party of China (CPC)′s leadership and accelerating its entry into the forefront of innovative countries.

Key words: supervision through inspection, regional innovation, R&D investment, masking effect