提高国资监管效能、促进国企高质量发展是国资国企改革的重要目标。本文以2010—2021年A股国有上市公司年度数据为样本,采用实证研究方法从微观企业层面考察了国有资本授权经营对全要素生产率的影响及其作用机制。研究发现:国有资本授权经营显著提升了国企全要素生产率。该结论在进行多项稳健性检验后依然稳健。国有股东委派董事对国企全要素生产率并未产生显著的治理效应,但委派高管强化了国有资本授权经营的生产率提升效应。国有资本授权经营对央企、竞争性国企和低市场化进程地区国企的生产率提升效应更强。研究结论表明,国资监管机构应加大国有资本授放权力度,提升董事履职能力,强化经理层治理,进一步改善地方国企、非竞争性国企、高市场化进程地区的国有资本授权经营治理。

Improving the efficiency of state-owned assets supervision and promoting the high-quality development of state-owned enterprises is an important goal of state-owned assets and state-owned enterprises reform. Taking the annual data of A-share state-owned listed companies from 2010 to 2021 as samples, this paper used the empirical research method to examine the impact of state-owned capital authorized operation on total factor productivity and its mechanism from the micro-enterprise level. We found that increasing the intensity of authorization can significantly improve the total factor productivity of state-owned enterprises. The conclusion is still credible after multiple robustness tests. The appointment of directors by state-owned shareholders has no significant effect on the supervision and governance effect of state-owned assets, while the appointment of senior executives strengthens the productivity enhancement effect of state-owned capital authorized operation. The state-owned capital authorized operation has a stronger productivity improvement effect on central enterprises, competitive state-owned enterprises and low market process areas. The conclusion showed that the state assets regulator should raise the authorization, enhance the ability of directors to perform their duties, strengthen the governance of managers, and further improve the governance effect of state-owned capital authorized operation in local state-owned enterprises, non-competitive state-owned enterprises, and areas with high marketization process.