创新是“双循环”新发展格局的重要引擎，如何通过产业支持政策形成市场有效、政府有为的创新体系推动制造业高质量发展至关重要。本文以2012—2019年我国沪深两市A股制造业上市公司数据匹配中央与地方“五年规划”文本，实证分析央-地分权制度背景下产业政策的有效边界和作用路径。研究发现：（1）地方产业政策能较好地发挥辖区比较优势并促进企业创新，产权性质和专利属性的异质性分析发现央地政策效果存在明显偏差；（2）央-地政策协同能够实现中央政策前瞻性甄别优势和地方资源效率化整合优势的内嵌互补进而激励企业创新，偏离中央顶层设计或地方禀赋优势的央-地政策偏向不利于企业创新；（3）央-地政策协同既能以财政补贴和税收优惠方式直接推动企业创新，也能通过弱化行政壁垒和地方保护，发挥市场竞争机制间接促进企业创新。本研究丰富了政府产业支持政策对企业创新影响的相关文献，并为释放央-地政策的协同效应提供启示。
Abstract
The 14th Five-Year Plan clearly pointed out that China should accelerate the construction of a strong manufacturing country and exert the role of advanced manufacturing in the optimization of the industrial structure. In view of the coexistence of China′s market-and- administrative resource allocation, the government has issued a series of industrial policies aimed at encouraging enterprises to innovate. In this paper, the data of A-share manufacturing listed companies in Shanghai and Shenzhen stock ranging from 2012 to 2019 are matched with the central and local "Five-Year Plan" texts, and empirically analyzes the effective boundaries and role paths of industrial policies under the background of the central-local decentralization system.The significance of this paper lies in the following aspects: First, based on the contract theory, the paper analyzed the impact of industrial support policies on enterprise innovation under the divergence of central and local goals, and extended the existing debate on the "industrial policy effectiveness" to the exploration of "industrial policy effectiveness boundary". Secondly, from the institutional background of the central-local decentralization under the reform of China′s economic system, the paper clarified the influence of the central-local policy synergy of "reasonable planning" and the central-local policy deviation of "independent division of labor" on the industrial innovation pattern, therefore clears the policy model to stimulate innovation of Chinese enterprises under the innovation-driven-development strategy. Finally, based upon the implementation of government support policies, the paper explored the paths of central-local policy synergy from industry and enterprise levels, and divided them into fiscal and tax policies that directly affect enterprises and the optimization of institutional environment that indirectly affects industries and regions, in order to provide a scientific basis for improving the utilization efficiency of R&D resources.The research found that: (1) Compared with the strategically oriented central industrial support policies, the local policies can better promote the overall innovation level of enterprises by "adapting to local conditions". (2) Under the institutional background of the central-local decentralization system, the central government tends to encourage state-owned enterprises to carry out substantive innovations based on invention patents, while local governments prefer to encourage private enterprises to carry out strategic innovations based on non-invention patents. (3) Central-local policy synergy can realize the embedded complementation of the central policy′s forward-looking screening advantage and the local resource efficiency integration advantage, thereby stimulating enterprise innovation. Many drawbacks such as local governments do not conform to local comparative advantage industries in order to meet the central policy development have not emerged. (4) The central-local policy deviation that seriously deviates from the central top-level design capability and the local resource endowment advantage is not conducive to enterprise innovation. (5) Central-local policy synergy can not only directly affect enterprise innovation in the form of financial subsidies and tax incentives, but also indirectly affect enterprise innovation by weakening administrative barrier and local protectionism and giving play to the market competition mechanism.The policy implications can be summarized as follows: (1) The policy makers should streamline administration and delegate power, consolidate the dominant position of the market mechanism in the allocation of R&D resources. (2) They should make the best use of the situation and realize the drainage effect of top-level design in the development of industrial innovation strategy. (3) They should also adapt measures to local conditions and give full play to the comparative advantages of local factor endowments in the transformation of the industrial structure. (4) They should execute effective coordination to improve the coupling degree of central-local policies in core technological innovation.
关键词
产业支持政策 /
央-地分权 /
偏差 /
协同 /
制造业创新
Key words
industrial support policy /
central-local decentralization /
deviation /
synergy /
manufacturing innovation
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基金
国家自然科学基金专项项目：“科学基金基础研究多元投入路径与经费管理模式研究”（K1924001, 2019.09—2020.12）。
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