本文从信号传递理论的视角研究创新能力强的标的企业在并购中的行为。基于2014-2019年我国上市公司的股权并购事件，以标的公司的专利被引情况度量其创新能力，采用Logit模型检验了标的方的创新能力对其签订业绩补偿承诺意愿的影响。进一步地，本文考虑并验证了投资风险的中介效应、专利诉讼环境的调节效应，藉此从发生机制上系统解释本文的主要发现。研究结果表明，创新能力强的标的公司更倾向于签订业绩补偿承诺，且该现象在未设立专门的知识产权法院的地区更为明显，表明业绩补偿承诺对于创新能力强的公司可能更类似“锦上添花”的作用；本文还发现创新能力强的被并购方往往具有较低的投资风险，因此签订业绩承诺的可能性更大。同时，标的公司创新能力越强，则越有可能达成承诺的业绩目标。本文的研究结论丰富了企业创新能力和业绩补偿承诺的研究，为业绩补偿承诺的流行提供了可能的解释与证据。在现实意义上，本文为并购方识别具有价值潜力的标的公司提供了新思路，即愿意做出业绩承诺的标的企业更有可能具备较高的创新能力，也为监管机构合理分配监管资源、维持并购交易秩序并防范风险提供了有益的经验证据。
Abstract
Performance compensation commitment, being more and more widely used, can alleviate information asymmetry in M&A and solve the problems of adverse selection and moral hazard. However, there is little research on the motivation of making commitment. Innovation ability is a key factor in M&A transaction. In order to prevent their own value from being underestimated, target firms with high innovation ability may be more inclined to make commitments and more confident to achieve performance goals, but they may also be reluctant to make commitments for the sake of cost saving and risk management. Therefore, are firms with high innovation capability "bolder" and dare to make performance commitments?On the one hand, companies with high innovation capability may tend to make performance commitments, so as to prevent from being undervalued. Performance commitments can also be used as a signal to depict a good prospect for the acquirer, thereby gaining a satisfactory bid. Because of its high innovation ability, companies do not have to worry about failing to achieve performance goals, so they can boldly make performance commitments or even high-performance goals. In addition, making performance commitments can also effectively repel other competitors and reach a final deal. However, on the other hand, companies with high innovation capability may be reluctant to make performance commitments to attract acquirer, because performance commitments may induce large cost and risks. For example, excessive resource consumption to achieve performance objectives and moral hazards caused by performance commitments are possible. And it is also possible to get a relatively fair bid without making performance commitments. Therefore, whether firms with high innovation capability tend more to make performance commitment is an empirical question with tension.Based on signaling theory, using the cited patents to measure the innovation ability of the target firm, this paper empirically investigates M&A events of China′s listed companies from 2014 to 2019 to studies the links between the target firm′s innovative ability and the possibility of its making performance compensation commitments by logistic regression. Furthermore, this paper also attempts to verify the mediating effect of investment risk and the moderating effect of patent judicial environment, so as to systematically explain the main findings of this paper. The paper finds that target firms with greater innovation ability is more inclined to make performance compensation commitments and the link is more obvious in the regions without an ad hoc intellectual property arbitration court, suggesting that performance compensation commitment may be more similar to the "icing on the cake" effect for companies with high innovation ability. It is also found that the firms with innovation ability have lower investment risk and is more likely to fulfill the performance commitments.The results enrich the literatures on both innovative ability and performance compensation commitments and provide possible explanation and evidence for the popularity of performance compensation commitment. Practically, this paper suggests a new idea for the bidding company to identify high-quality underlying assets, i.e., target companies that are willing to make performance commitments are more likely to have high innovation capabilities. The paper also provides helpful empirical evidence for authorities to regulate M&A events. Authorities can reasonably allocate regulatory resources based on whether the company has given performance commitments, strengthening the supervision of target companies that have not made performance commitments in M&A transactions, further protecting the interests of investors.
关键词
业绩承诺 /
创新能力 /
并购绩效 /
信号传递理论
Key words
performance commitment /
innovative ability /
M&A performance /
signaling theory
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基金
国家自然科学基金面上项目：“上市公司碳减排责任‘多言寡行’的系统识别、形成机制和治理路径”（72272170）；国家自然科学基金青年项目：“证券交易所信息披露监管的长短期治理效果研究：基于问询回函和后续披露的文本分析”（71902210）；教育部人文社会科学研究青年项目：“中国会计年度起讫日期的国际接轨路经研究”（19YJC630092）；中央高校基本科研业务费专项资金和中央财经大学科研创新团队支持计划资助项目：“企业环保‘多言寡行’的经济后果和治理路径研究：基于多学科融合视角”（校20210514）。
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