本文在Matsuyama与 G-S模型的基础上引入金融错配等变量，系统考察金融错配对企业创新的影响机理并予以模型刻画，进而提出核心命题。利用2003—2018年我国上市公司微观数据，在测算金融错配指数的基础上，从政策扭曲与金融摩擦双重视角对上述核心命题进行验证。研究结果发现：金融错配对企业创新具有明显的“抑制效应”，尤其是对企业“创新质量较高的发明专利”抑制作用更为显著。进一步检验揭示，金融错配会通过政策扭曲和金融摩擦这两条路径影响企业创新。本文研究意义在于不仅从微观层面揭示金融错配抑制创新的内在逻辑，同时从双视角进一步剖析金融错配的影响渠道，对于改善企业经营环境，促进企业创新具有重要的现实意义。

    Innovation has become a "new engine" to promote China′s economic growth and a key factor in the success or failure of economic restructuring. How to stimulate the innovation motivation of enterprises, change the mode of economic growth and enter the stage of high-quality development has become the most urgent and realistic problem. The innovation activities of enterprises are inseparable from the effective support of financial resources. However, China′s financial system shows serious misallocation. This is worth studying how does financial misallocation in the market affect the innovation behavior of enterprises.Therefore, this paper introduces financial misallocation and other variables on the basis of the Matsuyama model and G-S model, systematically examines the impact mechanism of financial misallocation on corporate innovation and characterizes the model, and then proposes core propositions. Using the micro data of China′s listed companies from 2003 to 2018, based on the calculation of financial misallocation index, the above core propositions are verified from the dual perspective of policy distortion and financial friction. The results of the study found that financial misallocation companies have a significant "suppressive effect" on innovation, especially on companies that have "higher quality innovation patents". Further inspection revealed that financial mismatch will affect corporate innovation through two paths: policy distortion and financial friction.
    The research results of this paper have the following two contributions. First of all, this paper uses mathematical models and theoretical analysis to reveal to some extent the mechanism by which financial misallocation affect the innovation of Chinese enterprises, thereby providing new evidence for the innovation and development of Chinese enterprises. Secondly, from the dual perspective of policy distortion and financial market friction, the internal mechanism and transmission path of financial mismatch affecting corporate innovation is analyzed. The results of the study found that financial friction caused by imperfect market mechanisms and improper government intervention are the main ways to cause financial mismatches to inhibit corporate innovation and seriously inhibit the improvement of the quality of innovation in China. This provides a new perspective for the development of corporate innovation theory.
   The research conclusions of this paper have important implications for enhancing the enthusiasm of Chinese enterprises′ innovation activities. First of all, accelerating the marketization process of the financial system, promoting the rationalization and effectiveness of the allocation function of the financial market, reducing financial market friction, and trying to eliminate financial misallocation in the financial system. On the one hand, we continue to promote the reform of capital factor prices to form a reasonable capital factor price system, so that capital factor prices become a signal for the allocation of financial markets and improve finance. The efficiency of resource allocation creates a relatively fair competitive environment for companies of different ownerships and sizes, and strives to reduce financial frictions and ease external financing constraints faced by production activities of enterprises; on the other hand, by establishing multiple levels financial market system: increasing market access rate; developing inclusive finance to strengthen financial market construction; providing a broader development stage for the stock market and non-state-owned financial institutions; and promoting healthy and orderly competition among various entities in the financial market. Enterprises create more channels to access financial resources and promote innovation investment.
   Secondly, the government should change its position and function, reduce policy distortion and gradually withdraw from the national credit guarantee in the financial field, eliminate the preference of loan ownership of "meat rots in the pot" and "funds transfer from the left pocket to the right pocket", reduce ownership discrimination in the process of financial resource allocation, and create a reasonable financial ecological environment for enterprises. The government′s position should help state-owned enterprises to obtain low-cost capital, which should be transferred to encourage financial institutions to allocate more resources to non-state-owned enterprises, especially those with strong innovation ability and high demand for innovative capital, so as to reduce the mismatch of financial resources of enterprises and improve the innovation power of enterprises. 
    Finally, enterprises should strengthen their own capacity of financing. Compared with other activities, enterprise innovation activities have a high degree of uncertainty. This feature makes innovation contain information asymmetry and induce potential moral hazards, which leads to more severe external financing constraints faced by innovation activities. The financing constraints faced by enterprises are not only related to financial mismatches at the macro level, but also closely related to the construction of enterprises at the micro level in order to eliminate the gold caused by information asymmetry between enterprises and financial institutions to the greatest extent. In order to alleviate the external financing constraints and promote innovation, enterprises should strengthen the construction of their own credit system, establish and improve the information disclosure system, and reduce the risk of default caused by information asymmetry.