高管团队特征和企业创新是理论界和实务界关注的焦点。本文采用2016—2017年间A股上市公司的高管团队背景、专利、销售和公司治理数据,采用多层次回归模型,实证分析高管的工种、行业和地理跨界对企业创新投入、创新产出数量和质量的影响,并检验高管激励的调节效应。研究结果表明:高管的工种、行业和地理跨界对企业创新产出数量和质量有显著的促进作用,进而提升企业创新效率;薪酬激励对跨界高管的创新行为有明显的激励作用,而股权激励的效果欠佳。在理论上深化了高管团队与企业创新研究,并为高管团队构建和管理激励提出对策建议。
Abstract
Enterprises should not only focus on core competitiveness to keep mature markets, but also explore new markets and new technologies to achieve timely transformation and upgrading, so as to maintain competitive advantages. Innovation is the key to the survival and development of an enterprise. Therefore, the characteristics of executive team and enterprise innovation are the focus of theoretical and practical circles. Existing studies mostly discuss the influence of single characteristics such as executive education background, technical expertise, overseas background, academic background, political connection and social relationship network on innovation based on high-level theory, but ignore the interaction of individual characteristics such as transboundary and generalist. At present, the few studies on specialists and generalists have not reached a consensus. According to the higher order theory, professionals with professional and targeted knowledge structure tend to sign long-term contracts, and do not have to worry about the failure of innovation to endanger jobs, which is conducive to the realization of value creation in specific fields through the concentration of resources of specialized human capital under the protection of long-term contracts. The main reason for the difference is that high-level theoretical scholars study the impact of cross-border on enterprise innovation from the perspective of the innovation ability of cross-border executives, while institutional theoretical scholars study the impact of cross-border on enterprise innovation from the perspective of innovation willingness. They did not put the innovation ability and willingness of cross-border executives into a research framework. Moreover, the current crossover of senior executives is mainly from the perspective of generalists and professionals. However, with the convergence of industry development and the alternation of technology, most practitioners experience multiple positions and industries, and it is difficult to generally define a specialist or a generalist. Based on the above considerations, this paper believes that it is necessary to deeply discuss the relationship between executive experience crossover and enterprise innovation, clarify the situational effect of executive experience crossover on enterprise innovation, and deepen the understanding of relevant issues.
This paper theoretically analyzes the impact of executives′ crossover on enterprise innovation from two aspects of innovation ability and innovation willingness. The strategic decision of managers is the balance of the specific company system. Therefore, this paper analyzes the moderating effect of equity incentive and salary incentive on the innovation behavior of cross-border executives. The research hypothesis is put forward on the basis of above theoretical analysis. In addition, a multi-level regression model was used to analyze the impact of cross-border job types, industry and geography on enterprise innovation, as well as the moderating effect of executive incentives based on the panel data of executive team background, corporate innovation and corporate governance of a-share listed companies in China between 2016 to 2017 from CSMAR and CNISA. Several conclusions are drawn in this paper. Although the cross-border experience of senior executives has no obvious impact on the innovation investment of the company, it is conducive to the formation of compound knowledge structure and the improvement of the ability of senior executives, which can improve the innovation ability and willingness of senior executives as well as the innovation ability of the company. The improvement of the company′s innovation ability can improve the quantity and quality of the company′s innovation output. Under the condition that the R&D input remains unchanged, the improvement of innovation output can improve the company′s innovation efficiency. In other words, the cross-border experience of the management greatly contributes to the improvement of the innovation efficiency of the company. Industry experience is particularly significant in improving innovation efficiency. Salary incentive is a short-term incentive strategy, which has a more obvious incentive effect on the innovation behavior of cross-border executives who tend to sign short-term contracts. In other words, salary incentive has a positive regulating effect on the relationship between executives′ cross-border experience and corporate innovation. The lower the crossover degree of senior executives, the stronger the specificity of their human capital. Specific human capital tends to sign long-term contracts. Equity incentive is a long-term incentive strategy, which has a stronger incentive effect on innovation for executives inclined to sign long-term contracts, but a limited incentive effect on cross-border executives inclined to sign short-term contracts, that is, the moderating effect of equity incentive on the relationship between cross-border experience of executives and enterprise innovation is not obvious. This paper theoretically reveals the "black box" of the influence of executives′ crossover on enterprise innovation, and provides a new perspective for higher-order theoretical research. Empirical analysis of the impact of executives crossing boundaries on corporate innovation and the regulatory effect of executives′ incentives on their innovation behavior. The research not only provides beneficial supplement for the previous related research, but also provides guidance for the management of enterprises. However, this paper has some limitations. The research only theoretically analyzes the path effect of innovation ability and innovation intention, but has not done empirical analysis due to the lack of data. The following research will use the questionnaire method to make an empirical test on the innovation ability and innovation intention of cross-border executives, so as to enhance the explanatory power of the relationship between cross-border and innovation.
Senior management team plays a decisive role in enterprise innovation. The inter-disciplinary knowledge structure and coordination ability of cross-disciplinary executives can not only improve the innovation ability and willingness of individuals, but also greatly contribute to the improvement of the innovation ability of companies. Based on the above research conclusions, this paper proposes the following management implications. Advances in technology and industry convergence have led to an increasing demand for cross-industry senior managers. High-quality development of enterprises needs to keep pace with the times to develop talent training plans. Enterprises can improve the knowledge and capability structure of the management team through the cultivation and stimulation of internal trans-boundary talents, so that enterprises can adapt to the changing market environment. Enterprises should cultivate more compound talents and encourage internal staff to carry out re-education and professional training through reasonable contract design. Through the recruitment of cross - boundary executives with stronger innovation ability and willingness to inject new force into enterprise management. Cross-border executives can promote the development of enterprise innovation and enhance the value of the company′s innovation. Executive behavior is largely influenced by the corporate system. For professional executives who tend to sign short-term contracts, companies can promote innovation through long-term contracts and equity incentives. For generalist executives who tend to sign short-term contracts, companies can adopt short-term contracts and salary incentives to promote their innovation.
关键词
高管经历跨界 /
企业创新 /
股权激励 /
薪酬激励
Key words
executives′ transboundary experience /
enterprise innovation /
shareholding incentive /
salary incentive
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基金
河南省高等学校重点科研项目(20A630024,2019.07—2021.12;18A630038,2017.07—2019.12)。