基于控股权性质差异视角，本文首先理论分析金融错配对国有与民营企业技术创新产出及其模式选择的差异性影响，以及政府补贴在缓解金融错配影响企业技术创新时的政策效应；然后再以我国A股市场2012—2019年期间上市企业为样本并基于面板数据模型进行实证检验。研究结果表明：虽然金融错配有助于增加国有企业技术创新产出，但它在降低民营企业创新产出水平的同时，会严重阻碍国有与民营企业原始发明创新能力的提升；政府补贴能有效缓解金融错配对民营企业技术创新产出与原始发明创新能力的不利影响，并对其研发投入产生正向“挤入效应”，但它对国有企业技术创新投入与产出的政策效果均不显著。
Abstract
It is important for financial institutions to bring such functions as financial intermediation, risk diversification and revenue assessment into play to improve a nation′s technological innovation capacity, and whether or not to be able to finance enough external equity funds and debts will have an important impact on enterprises′ technological innovation activity and their according technological innovation strategies. However, there exists serious binary ownership financial misallocation under the background of binary ownership economic structure and government′s dominance on financial resource allocation. As misallocation of limited and scarce financial resource appears, not only does it make those enterprises with stronger innovation aspiration and higher innovation efficiency fall into financing dilemma, it always results in the distortion of capital price and the loss of financial system′s risk diversification and revenue assessment functions, which will hider enterprises from conducting technological innovation and thus improving their technological innovation capability.
As an important measure to encourage enterprises to innovate, subsidies are often used by many governments. Although previous studies have paid much attention to discuss the influence mechanism, conducive pathway and the policy effect of government subsidies on enterprises′ R&D and innovation outputs under the hypothesis of financial resource being allocated reasonably, and further attention has been paid to discuss the influence of government subsidies on encouraging enterprises with different ownership to innovate, there exist few studies discussing government subsidies′ policy effect under the background of financial resource being misallocated. Accordingly, this paper is aimed to discuss the policy effect and conducive mechanism of government subsidies on technological innovation of enterprises confronted with financial misallocation constraints from the perspective of different enterprise′s ownership.
After analyzing the impact of financial misallocation on enterprises′ technological innovation with different ownership and the according government subsidy effect theoretically, this paper constructed enterprise′s financial misallocation degree measuring model firstly. And then a specific measurement was conducted using the data of listed companies in China′s A stock market from 2012 to 2019 as a sample, which was used to continue the following empirical test. As is found out: (1) Although financial misallocation can improve state-owned companies′ technological innovation outputs, it decreases private companies′ technological innovation outputs and hinders the improvement of both state-owned and private companies′ original invention capability seriously. (2) Not only can government subsidy help to alleviate the negative effect of financial misallocation on private companies′ technological innovation outputs and their original invention capability, but stimulate them to increase their R&D under financial misallocation circumstance. (3) Government subsidies can not do any help to improve state-owned companies′ R&D and their technological innovation outputs yet.
Compared with the existing literature, the possible margin contributions of this paper lie in: (1) A model to measure enterprises′ financial misallocation degree was constructed based on financing need theory creatively. Not only does it enrich existing financial misallocation measuring method, it also provide references for further research concerning enterprises′ financial misallocation problems. (2) The policy effects of government subsidies on encouraging enterprises to innovate were discussed from both financial misallocation constraint and enterprises′ ownership difference perspectives, which will complement the previous literature concerning the relationship between government subsidies and enterprises′ technological innovation. (3) The results acquired in this paper can help regional governments to optimize their financial resource allocation and perfect their government-subsidy mechanism in order to improve local enterprises′ original invention capability.
关键词
控股权性质 /
金融错配 /
技术创新 /
政府补贴效应
Key words
nature of controlling interest /
financial misallocation /
technological innovation /
government subsidy effect
{{custom_sec.title}}
{{custom_sec.title}}
{{custom_sec.content}}
参考文献
[1] King and Levine. Finance, Entrepreneurship and Growth: Theory and Evidence[J]. Journal of Monetary and
Economics, 1993, 32(3): 513-542.
[2]Brown, J.R., Fazzari, S.M., and Petersen, B.C..Financing Innovation and Growth: Cash Flow, External Equity and
the 1990's R&D Boom[J]. Journal of Finance, 2009, 64(1): 151-185.
[3]Ang, J.S., Cheng, Y., and Wu, C.. Does Enforcement of Intellectual Property Rights Matter in China? Evidence
from Financing and Investment Choices in the High-Tech Industry[J]. Review of Economics and Statistics, 2014,
96(2): 332-348.
[4]Z. Song, K. Storesletten and F. Zilibotti. Growing like China[J]. The American Economic Review, 2011, 101(2):
196- 233.
[5]靳来群. 所有制歧视所致金融资源错配程度分析[J]. 经济学动态, 2015(6): 36-44.
Jin Laiqin. Analysis of Ownership Discrimination on Financial Misallocation Degree[J]. Economic Perspective,
2015(6):36-44.
[6]戴利君, 刘斌斌. 控股权性质、外部融资需求与上市企业定向增发资源错配[J]. 企业经济, 2018(8): 105-110.
Dai Lijun, Liu Binbin. Ownership, Exterior Financing Need and Listed Enterprises' Private Placement Resource
Misallocation[J]. Enterprise Economy, 2018(8): 105-110.
[7]Xu K., Huang K.F., Xu E.. Giving fish or teaching to fish? An empirical study of the effects of government
research and development policies[J]. R&D management, 2014, 44(5): pp.484-497.
[8]杨亭亭, 罗连化, 许伯桐. 政府补贴的技术创新效应：“量变”还是“质变”？[J]. 中国软科学, 2018(10): 52-61.
Yang Tingting, Luo Lianhua, Xu Botong. The Technical Innovation Effect of Government Subsidy: "Quantity
Chang" or "Quality Change"[J]. China Soft Science, 2018(10): 52-61.
[9]范寒冰, 徐承宇. 我国政府补贴促进了企业实质性创新吗?[J]. 暨南学报, 2018(7): 1-13.
Fan Hanbing, Xu Chengyu. Do Government Subsidies Promote Enterprises' Substantial Innovation[J]. Jinan
Journal, 2018(7): 1-13.
[10]邓若冰. 产权性质、政府补贴与企业研发投入—基于政治寻租视角[J]. 软科学, 2018(3): 5-9.
Deng Ruobing. Property Rights, Government Subsidies and R&D Investment—Based on the Perspective of
Political Rent-seeking[J]. Soft Science, 2018(3): 5-9.
[11]李苗苗, 肖洪钧, 赵爽. 金融发展、技术创新与经济增长的关系研究：基于中国的省市面板数据[J]. 中国
管理科学, 2015(2): 162-169.
Li Miaomiao, Xiao Hongjun, Zhao Shuang. Study on the Relationship among the Financial Development,
Technological Innovation and Economic Growth Based on China's Provincial Panel Data[J]. China Journal of
Management Science, 2015(2): 162-169.
[12]黎杰生, 胡颖. 金融集聚对技术创新的影响：来自中国省级层面的证据[J]. 金融论坛, 2017(7): 41-54.
Li Jiesheng, Hu Ying. The Influence of Financial Agglomeration on Technological Innovation—Provincial
Evidences in China[J]. Financial Forum, 2017(7): 41-54.
[13]Huang Y.S.. Selling China: Foreign direct investment during the reform era[M]. Cambridge: Cambridge
University Press, 2003.
[14]Hsieh C.T., Klenow P.J. Misallocation and manufacturing TFP in China and India[J]. Quarterly Journal of
Economics, 2009, 124(4): 1403-1448.
[15]Moll B.. Productivity losses from financial friction: Can self-financing undo capital misallocation?[J]. American
Economic Review, 2014, 104(10): 3186-3221.
[16]Midrigan V., D.X. Xu. Financial and misallocation: Evidence from panel-level data[J]. American Economic
Review, 2014, 102(2): 422-458.
[17]刘斌斌, 严武, 黄小勇. 信贷错配对我国绿色技术创新影响分析—基于地区环境规制差异视角[J]. 当代财
经, 2019(9): 60-71.
Liu Binbin, Yan Wu, Huang Xiaoyong. Analysis of the Impact of Loan Misallocation on China's Green Technological Innovation: From the Perspective of Regional Environment Regulation Discrepancies[J].
Contemporary Finance &Economics, 2019(9): 60-71
[18]Chen V.Z., Li J., Shapiro D.M. and Zhang X.. Ownership Structure and Innovation: An Emerging Market
Perspective[J]. Asia Pacific Journal of Management, 2014, 31(1): 1-24.
[19]Carman J.M. and Dominguez L.V.. Organizational Transformations in Transition Economics: Hypotheses[J].
Journal of Macro- marketing, 2001, 21(2): 164-180.
[20]Kleer R.. Government R&D Subsidies as a Signal for Private Investors[J]. Research Policy, 2010, 39(10): 1361-
1374.
[21]Besharov M. and Smith W.. Multiple Logics in Organizations: Explaining Their Varied Nature and Implications
[J]. Academy of Management Review, 2014, 39(3): 364-381.
[22]杨继生, 阳建辉. 行政垄断、政治庇佑与国有企业的超额成本[J]. 经济研究, 2015(4): 50-62.
Yang Jisheng, Yang Jianhui. Administrative Monopoly, Political patronage and the Extra-Cost of the State-owned
Firms[J]. Economic Research Journal, 2015(4): 50-62.
[23]林毅夫, 李志赟. 政策性负担、道德风险与预算软约束[J]. 经济研究, 2004(2): 17-27.
Lin Yifu, Li Zhiyun. Policy Burden, Moral Hazard and Soft Budget Constraint[J]. Economic Research Journal,
2004(2): 17-27.
[24]赵璨, 王竹泉, 杨德明, 曹伟. 企业迎合行为与政府补贴绩效研究—基于企业不同盈利状况的分析[J]. 中
国工业经济, 2015(7): 130-145.
Zhao Can, Wang Zhuquan, Yang Deming, Cao Wei. Research on the Catering Behavior of Enterprise and
Government Subsidy Performance-Based on the Analysis of the Enterprise's Profitability[J]. China Industrial
Economy, 2015(7): 130-145.
[25]Tether B.S.. Who Co-operates for Innovation and Why: An Empirical Analysis[J]. Research Policy, 2002, 31(6):
947- 967.
[26]Kang K.N. and Park H.. Influence of Government R&D Support and Inter-firm Collaborations on Innovation in
Korean Biotechnology SMEs[J]. Technovation, 2012, 32(1): 68-78.
[27]陈明明, 张国胜, 孙秀. 国有企业、政府补贴与企业创新供给—基于上市工业企业的实证研究[J]. 当代财
经, 2016(10): 34-44.
Chen Mingming, Zhang Guosheng, Sun Xiu. Stated-owned Enterprise, Government Subsidy and Corporate
Innovation Supply: An Empirical Analysis Based on Listed Industrial Companies[J]. Contemporary Finance &
Economics, 2016(10): 34-44.
[28]蔡栋梁, 李欣玲, 李天舒. 政府补贴与寻租对企业研发投入的影响[J]. 财经科学, 2018(5): 105-118.
Cai Dongliang, Li Xinling, Li Tianshu. The Effect of Government Subsidies and Rent-seeking on R&D of
Enterprises[J]. Finance & Economics, 2018(5): 105-118.
[29]Tan, Y., X. Tian, C.X. Zhang, and H. Zhao. Privatization and Innovation: Evidence from a Quasi-Natural
Experiment in China[M]. Social Science Electronic Publishing, 2014.
[30]Demirguc-kunt A., Maksimovic V., Law, Finance and Firm Growth[J]. Journal of Finance, 1998, 153(6):
2107- 2137.
[31]Durnev A., Kim E.H.. To Steal or not to steal: Firm attributes, legal environment and valuation[J]. Journal of
Finance, 2005, 60(3): 1461-1493.
[32]黎文靖, 郑曼妮. 实质性创新还是策略性创新？—宏观产业政策对微观企业创新的影响[J]. 经济研究,
2016(4): 60-73.
Li Wenjing, Zheng Manni. Is it Substantive or Strategic Innovation?—Impact on Macroeconomic Policies on
Micro-enterprises' Innovation[J]. Economic Research Journal, 2016(4): 60-73.
[33]杨洋, 魏江, 罗来军. 谁在利用政府补贴进行创新？—所有制和要素市场扭曲的联合调节效应[J]. 管理
世界, 2015(1): 75-86.
Yang Yang, Wei Jiang, Luo Laijun. Who is Using Government Subsidies for Innovation?—Based on the Joint
Adjustment Effect of Ownership and Distortion of Factor Market[J]. Management World, 2015(1): 75-86.
基金
国家社会科学基金：“企业技术创新模式选择及其金融资源错配纠偏机制设计与路径优化对策研究”（17BJY035，2017.07—2020.05）；江西省高校人文社科项目：“民营企业创新效率提升及其适配性金融结构设计与优化对策研究”（JJ21114, 2021.10—2023.06）。
PDF(1270 KB)
