由于我国经济快速发展的迫切需求，危险品海运量逐年升高，港口危险品安全事故亦呈现出频发之势，对社会环境造成了巨大危害。构建科学的港口危险品管理体系，系统探讨决策主体间的关系和需求，是有效预防此类问题发生的关键。首先，以责任、发展和效益为目标，构建基于CSV理论的研究框架。其次，依据港口供应链分析，确定港口运营商、港口物流商、政府的功能定位。再次，建立两阶段主从博弈，设定预期安全系数、监管成本基数等变量，对各主体行为进行建模和求解。研究结果表明：政府设定的预期安全系数能显著影响港口运营商订购量，当预期安全系数依据CSV目标设定时，订购量将跃升至高位，港口运营商能够积极承担CSR与区域协同发展。另外，政府通过监管成本基数设置，能够有效控制港口物流商的安全状态。
Abstract
Due to the urgent needs of China′s rapid economic development, the amount of hazardous cargoes shipped by sea is increasing year by year, and safety accidents of port hazardous cargoes also show a tendency of frequent occurrence, which has caused great harm to the social environment. How to prevent accidents effectively and realize the sustainable development of port area is a hot issue to be solved urgently.
In general, there are two types of problems in the management of port hazardous cargoes in China: (1) The motivation and behavior of port corporations to assume safety responsibility. (2) The relationship and positioning between port corporations and the government. This makes all parties of the port hazardous cargoes management only emphasize the formal compliance, ignoring the mutual coordination under the unified goal, which eventually leads to the accident under the lack of responsibility. Thus, it is difficult to effectively balance the interests of all the parties only from a single perspective of administrative supervision or enterprise management. The effective way to solve this problem is to systematically discuss the relationship and demand between decision-makers, and to construct a management system for port hazardous cargoes that achieves the dual goals of economic benefit and social responsibility.
At present, the relevant studies on port hazardous cargoes are mainly carried out from the aspects of facility layout, risk assessment, shipping safety and port operation process, etc., but there are few discussions on the port corporation behavior and government supervision from the perspective of CSR, and the relevant empirical studies are particularly lacking. As a deepening of the connotation of CSR, CSV emphasizes that corporations achieve both social and economic goals by creating shared values. In view of this, firstly, from the perspective of CSR, a research and analysis framework based on the theory of CSV is constructed, aiming at responsibility, development and benefits. Secondly, based on the analysis of port supply chain, the function positioning of port operators, port logistics providers and government is determined. Thirdly, a two-stage leader-follower game is established, and variables such as the expected safety factor and the supervision cost base are set to model and solve the behavior of each subject.
The results show that the expected safety factor set by the government can significantly affect the order volume of port operators. When the expected safety factor is set according to the CSV target, the order volume will jump to a high level, and port operators can actively undertake the collaborative development of CSR and the region. In addition, the government can effectively control the security state of port logistics providers by supervising the setting of cost base.
From the perspective of CSR, this paper puts forward a research and analysis framework with development, responsibility and benefit as the systematic goals, which makes up for the shortcomings of previous related studies and broadens the application scope of CSV theory. The results of the empirical research also provide a decision for reference for ensuring the safety of the port area, promoting the parties to actively assume social responsibilities, and realizing the coordinated development of the port and society.
关键词
港口危险品 /
企业社会责任 /
共享价值创造 /
两阶段主从博弈
Key words
hazardous cargoes in ports /
corporate social responsibility /
shared value creation /
two-stage leader-follower game
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基金
国家自然科学基金项目：“基于物联网的集装箱支线船舶与集卡动态协调调度的模型与算法研究”(71572022,2016.01.01—2019.12.31)；“自动化集装箱码头堆存决策与机械调度的协同优化方法研究”(71971035,2020.01.01—2023.12.31)。
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