科技企业破产阶段专利拍卖模型及启示

徐明; 姜南

PDF(766 KB)

科研管理 ›› 2021, Vol. 42 ›› Issue (9) : 94-102.

论文

科技企业破产阶段专利拍卖模型及启示

徐明,姜南

作者信息 +

Patent auction model in the bankruptcy period of technology companies and enlightenment

Xu Ming, Jiang Nan

Author information +

文章历史 +

摘要

专利权的有效性以按时缴纳年费为前提，一旦企业破产清算完毕主体资格将被注销，虽然专利仍有价值，但却将因无人缴纳年费而终止。在破产阶段，专利拍卖能够实现技术转移。通过对专利特征、拍卖动机、拍卖模型、多竞拍者拍卖等因素的研究，得出结论：如果破产后企业所有者希望继续使用专利技术，则其不会启动专利拍卖程序；如果专利拍卖的成本低于专利拍卖的成交额，债权人委员会将启动专利拍卖程序；专利的前期研发成本越高，则拍卖成交的概率越大；参与竞拍的企业数量越多，则拍卖获得较高成交额的概率越大；以竞拍联盟形式参与专利拍卖，能够降低每家竞拍企业的成本和风险。由此提出明确专利强制拍卖情形、降低专利拍卖成本、鼓励专利组合拍卖、采用集中竞拍、多形态专利拍卖等建议。

Abstract

The validity of patent right is based on timely payment of annual fee. Once the patentee goes bankruptcy, the qualification of enterprise entity will be cancelled. Although the patent itself still has value, patent right will be terminated because no one pays annual fee after bankruptcy. During bankruptcy period, patents can be used to realize the technology transfer through auction procedure, which can not only repay the debts of enterprises to maximum extent, but also extend the validity and value of these patents. This article focuses on the question: how to achieve the continuation of patent value through patent auctions during the bankruptcy period of technology companies.
Patent is different from general property, auction is different from bilateral negotiation, bankruptcy is different from enterprise existence, so it is necessary to fully consider the cross areas formed by these three differences. Recent academic research has clearly demonstrated three levels: first, patent is a property right that can be transferred through auction; second, the disposal of patent rights should be carefully considered during bankruptcy period; third, the auction method can maximize the benefits during bankruptcy period, and different auction method greatly affects the probability of final transaction. On the basis of existing research, this article focuses on next level: establishing a patent auction mechanism during the bankruptcy period.
Through the study of patent characteristics, auction motivation in bankruptcy period, basic patent auction model and multi bidders auction model, five basic propositions are obtained. First, if the business owner wishes to continue using the patented technology after bankruptcy, he will not initiate patent auction procedure by his own. Second, if the cost of the patent auction is lower than the revenue of patent auction, patent auction procedure should be activated by creditor committee. Third, the higher R&D cost of a patent, the greater probability of patent will be sold by auction. Fourth, the more companies that participate in patent auction, the greater probability of patent to obtain a higher revenue. Fifth, allowing to participate in patent auctions in form of alliances can reduce the cost and risk of each company members.
Based on the research design above, five proposals are proposed. First, clarify the situation of compulsory patent auction. For state-owned enterprises, state-funded projects, and debt enterprises, there should be considered to start a compulsory patent auction procedure during bankruptcy period. Second, reduce the cost of patent auctions. The delivery of auction information can be achieved through industry associations, patent union organizations and other organizations. Internet companies have established auction platforms in recent years, and competition between auction platforms will also help reduce the cost of patent auction. Third, patent portfolio auction should be encouraged. Patent portfolio has more patent types, covers a larger scope of protection, and reduces the duplication cost in evaluating each patent. Fourth, use centralized bidding instead of single inquiry. In the specific auction process, try to use the mode of centralized bidding by multiple companies, which can not only create an auction atmosphere, but also help to get a higher revenue. Fifth, encourage a multi-modal patent auction model. British auction mode, Dutch auction mode, First-Price auction mode and Second-Price auction mode can be introduced to patent auction procedure, which can be able to find the most suitable model for patent auction during bankruptcy period in practice.
On June 18, 2020, the China Auction Industry Association issued the "Intellectual Property (Patent) Auction Regulation", which is implemented on October 1, 2020. This regulation fills the gap in China′s patent auction standards and speed up the transfer of patent rights. For bankrupt enterprises, patent assert can be auctioned in accordance with this regulation during bankruptcy period, which can not only realize the continuation of the patent value, but also be beneficial to repay debts to creditors.

导出引用

徐明姜南. 科技企业破产阶段专利拍卖模型及启示[J]. 科研管理. 2021, 42(9): 94-102

Xu Ming, Jiang Nan. Patent auction model in the bankruptcy period of technology companies and enlightenment[J]. Science Research Management. 2021, 42(9): 94-102

参考文献

[1] VISCOUNTY P J, VRIES M W, KENNEDY E M. Patent auctions: Emerging trend[J]. The National Law Journal, 2006, 27(86): 12-20.

[2] SNEED K A, JOHNSON D K. Selling ideas: The determinants of patent value in an auction environment[J]. R&D Management, 2009, 39(1): 87-94.

[3] NAIR S S, MATHEW M, NAG D. Dynamics between patent latent variables and patent price[J]. Technovation,2011, 31(12): 648-654.

[4] 刘鹏,方厚政.美国海洋托莫公司的专利拍卖实践及启示[J].科技与管理, 2012,14(5): 84-87.

LIU Peng. FANG Houzheng. Practice and inspirations of patent auction of Ocean Tomo[J]. Science-Technology and Management, 2012, 14(5): 84-87.

[5] FISCHER T, LEIDINGER J. Testing patent value indicators on directly observed patent value: an empirical analysis of Ocean Tomo patent auctions[J]. Research Policy, 2014, 43(3): 519-529.

[6] VIMALNATH P. A Comparison between singleton and portfolio patent valuation in auction mode of patent transaction[D]. Cambridge: University of Cambridge, 2018.

[7] CAHOY D R. Intellectual property exchanges and auctions: Non-traditional mechanisms for technology transfer[A]. Jacob H R. Research Handbook on Intellectual Property and Technology Transfer[C]. Edward Elgar Publishing, 2020, 283-308.

[8] CAVIGGIOLI F, UGHETTO E. Buyers in the patent auction market: Opening the black box of patent acquisitions by non-practicing entities[J]. Technological Forecasting and Social Change, 2015, 104(11): 122-132.

[9] KWON S. How does patent transfer affect innovation of firms?[J]. Technological Forecasting and Social Change, 2020, 154(5): 159-189.

[10] 黄敬前,高培青.科技成果拍卖可行性研究[J].科研管理,2002,23(1): 117-121.

HUANG Jingqian, GAO Peiqing. Study on the feasibility of selling by auction of science and technology goods[J]. Science Research Management, 2002,23(1): 117-121.

[11] 申文娇.一种新的专利交易方式——拍卖方式下的专利价值指标[J].中国科技信息,2012,24(23): 144-152.

SHEN Wenjiao. A new way of patent transaction: Patent value index under auction[J]. China Science and Technology Information, 2012, 24(23): 144-152.

[12] 方厚政,刘鹏.专利拍卖成交率影响因素的实证研究——以中国技术交易所为例[J].科学学研究,2013,31(12): 1835-1840.

FANG Houzheng, LIU Peng. An empirical study on sale rates of patent auctions: The case of China technology exchange[J]. Studies in Science of Science, 2013, 31(12): 1835-1840.

[13] 时奇,谌贻庆.股权投标专利拍卖收益比较研究[J].郑州航空工业管理学院学报,2014,32(3): 97-102.

SHI Qi, CHEN Yiqing. Comparative research on the profits of stock bidding patent auction[J]. Journal of Zhengzhou Institute of Aeronautical Industry Management, 2014, 32(3): 97-102.

[14] 石岩,谢富纪,刘浪.技术拍卖的最优机制[J].管理科学学报,2016,19(5): 28-40.

SHI Yan, XIE Fuji, LIU Lang. Optimal mechanism of technology auction[J]. Journal of Management Sciences in China, 2016, 19(5): 28-40.

[15] 陈婷,侯文华,刘露.网络外部性市场中竞争性企业技术引进和许可策略研究[J].管理学报,2020,17(4): 551-561.

CHEN Ting, HOU Wenhua, LIU Lu. Technology introduction and licensing strategy for competing firms under the condition of network externalities[J]. Chinese Journal of Management, 2020, 17(4): 551-561.

[16] 马荣康,金鹤,朱姗姗,刘凤朝.何时进行专利许可?考虑创新规模的企业专利许可时间决策研究[J].科研管理,2021,42(6): 49-57.

MA Rongkang, JIN He, ZHU Shanshan, LIU Fengchao. When to license? A research on the firms' decision-making on the timing of patent licensing under different innovation size[J]. Science Research Management, 2021, 42(6): 49-57.

[17] KREMER M. Patent buy outs: A mechanism for encouraging innovation[J]. Quarterly Journal of Economics, 1998, 113(4): 1137-1367.

[18] MILLS A A. The impact of bankruptcy on patent and copyright licenses[J]. Bankruptcy Developments Journal, 2001, 17(2): 575 - 604.

[19] STRICKLAND J M. Nonexclusive patent licensees unite: Use bankruptcy committees to sue for patent infringement[J]. Duke Law Journal, 1998, 48(3): 571-600.

[20] GEORGE C. The interaction between bankruptcy and intellectual property rights[J]. Australian Restructuring Insolvency and Turnaround Association Journal, 2018, 30(2): 25-32.

[21] CHOI Y, CHO S. The impact of bankruptcy on competitors’ innovations[A]. Academy of Management Proceedings[C]. New York: Briarcliff Manor, 2018: 34-67.

[22] SERRANO C J, ZIEDONIS R. How redeployable are patent assets? Evidence from failed startups[J]. NBER Working Papers, 2018.

[23] 佘时飞.技术创新、专利拍卖与社会福利[J].中北大学学报（社会科学版）,2009,25(5): 27-30.

SHE Shifei. A new way to promote technological innovation-patent auctioning[J]. Journal of North University of China (Social Science Edition), 2009, 25(5): 27-30.

[24] 刘春霖,张帆.知识产权拍卖问题与法律对策研究[J].河北师范大学学报（哲学社会科学版）,2014,37(6): 114-123.

LIU Chunlin, ZHANG Fan. A strategic study of the auctions of intellectual property right[J]. Journal of Hebei Normal University (Philosophy and Social Sciences Edition), 2014, 37(6): 114-123.

[25] THORBURN K S. Bankruptcy auctions: Costs, debt recovery, and firm survival[J]. Journal of Financial Economics, 2000, 58(3): 337-368.

[26] BOARD S. Bidding into the red: A model of post-auction bankruptcy[J]. The Journal of Finance, 2007, 62(6): 2695-2723.

[27] Eckbo B E, Malenko A, Thorburn K S. Strategic decisions in takeover auctions[J]. Tuck School of Business Working Paper, 2019, 34(10): 74-132.

[28] 向党,杨秀苔,向为民.破产体制与管理层收购中的拍卖模型分析[J].重庆大学学报, 2004, 27(5): 147-150.

XIANG Dang, YANG Xiutai, XIANG Weimin. The bankruptcy system and the auction model of management buyout[J]. Journal of Chongqing University, 2004, 27(5): 147-150.

[29] 赖一飞,陈文磊,蹇明,范文涛.内部职工在企业破产拍卖中的投标报价过高策略[J].系统工程理论与实践, 2011, 31(10): 1858-1863.

LAI Yifei, CHEN Wenlei, JIAN Ming, FAN Wen Tao. Overbidding strategy for firm’s staff in bankruptcy auctions[J]. Systems Engineering — Theory & Practice, 2011, 31(10): 1858-1863.

[30] 郭瑞.商事思维模式下破产财产变现问题研究[J].西南政法大学学报,2017,19(3): 93-99.

GUO Rui. The liquidation of bankruptcy estates from the perspective of commercial thinking mode[J]. Journal of Southwest University of Political Science & Law, 2017, 19(3): 93-99.