内部控制意愿、内部控制水平与盈余管理方式——基于文本分析与机器学习的计量方法

刘斌 李延喜 迟健心

科研管理 ›› 2021, Vol. 42 ›› Issue (9) : 166-174.

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科研管理 ›› 2021, Vol. 42 ›› Issue (9) : 166-174.
论文

内部控制意愿、内部控制水平与盈余管理方式——基于文本分析与机器学习的计量方法

  • 刘斌1,李延喜2,迟健心3
作者信息 +

Internal control willingness, internal control level and earnings management methods——The measurement method based on text analysis and machine learning

  • Liu Bin1, Li Yanxi2, Chi Jianxin Daniel3
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文章历史 +

摘要

    高质量内部控制水平能够抑制企业应计盈余管理,然而其抑制真实盈余管理的效果则莫衷一是,其中主观能动性因素的忽视可能是关键瘀点。我们提出“内部控制意愿”的概念,使用基于Python文本分析与机器学习的方法作为计量基础,检验其对企业内部控制水平和两类盈余管理的影响。研究发现:第一,内部控制意愿对内部控制水平具有显著正向影响。第二,内部控制意愿能够约束真实盈余管理行为,但无法显著影响应计盈余管理活动。第三,内部控制意愿在内部控制水平和应计盈余管理的关系中发挥调节效应,即企业持有积极内部控制意愿且达到高水平内部控制,能够显著提升对应计盈余管理的约束作用。我们发现了主观能动性因素在企业内部控制构建与执行活动中的重要作用;同时,建议企业董事会、外部监管部门重视内部控制意愿的培育。

Abstract

   High-quality internal-control level can suppress accrued earnings management, but its effectiveness in suppressing real earnings management is inconsistent. The neglect of subjective initiative factors may be the key point. We put forward the concept of Internal-control Willingness, which is a variable tool to measure the degree of subjective initiative of enterprise internal-control construction and execution activities. And using measurement methods by text analysis and machine learning based on Python, we examined the relationship between internal-control willingness, corporate internal-control level and the two types of earnings management. 
   The study found that: First, internal-control willingness has a significant positive impact on internal-control level. The specific performance are as follows: On the one hand, the company holds a positive internal-control willingness, the probability of its internal-control evaluation being effective is higher. On the other hand, the rate of obtaining a Standard Unqualified Opinion in the internal- control audit is greater.
   Second, internal-control willingness can constrain true earnings management behavior, but cannot significantly affect accrued earnings management activities. The mechanism are as follows: The enterprise holds the internal-control objective of Reasonably Ensuring the Legality and Compliance of Operation and Management and the Safety of Assets, and is willing to work in a positive manner, that it can indeed reduce the occurrence of real earnings management behavior, but it cannot reduce the Manipulative Accrued Profit activity space. Of course, the existence of Manipulative Accrued Profit activity space does not mean that companies must actually have accrued earnings management behaviors.
   Third, internal-control willingness exerts a moderating effect in the relationship between internal-control level and accrued earnings management, that is, enterprises with positive internal-control willingness to achieve high-quality internal-control level can significantly enhance the restraining effect of the Manipulative Accrued Profit activity space on which the accounting earnings management relies.
   Our study, on the one hand, introduces subjective initiative factors into the field of internal control, discovers the important role of subjective initiative factors in construction of corporate internal-control activities, enriches the empirical evidence and practical cognition in the field of internal control, and has theoretical significance of partial research blanks to fill the gaps in this field. On the other hand, our study verifies the relevance and mechanism of internal-control willingness and different types of earnings management behaviors of enterprises, and proposes behavioral decision-making basis and policy recommendations for the corporate body and supervisory departments to realize the practical value of internal-control willingness.
   The main contribution of our study lies in: Proposing and verifying the feasibility and application effect of internal-control willingness measurement method based on Python text analysis and machine learning methods. Empirical evidence shows that the internal-control willingness measurement method we designed can highlight the important role of internal-control subjective initiative in constraining earnings management behavior. We suggest that the board of directors and external supervisory departments pay attention to the cultivation of the internal-control willingness of enterprises, in order to improve the internal-control (overall) level of enterprises and restrain the earnings management activities of enterprises.

关键词

内部控制意愿 / 内部控制水平 / 应计盈余管理 / 真实盈余管理

Key words

 internal control willingness / internal control level / accrued earnings management / true earnings management

引用本文

导出引用
刘斌 李延喜 迟健心. 内部控制意愿、内部控制水平与盈余管理方式——基于文本分析与机器学习的计量方法[J]. 科研管理. 2021, 42(9): 166-174
Liu Bin, Li Yanxi, Chi Jianxin Daniel. Internal control willingness, internal control level and earnings management methods——The measurement method based on text analysis and machine learning[J]. Science Research Management. 2021, 42(9): 166-174

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基金

国家社会科学基金重大项目:“‘一带一路’国家资金融通机制设计及资金配置效率评价体系研究”(18ZAD095)。

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