科研管理 ›› 2021, Vol. 42 ›› Issue (8): 111-121.

• 论文 • 上一篇    下一篇

中央银行重复调运协调机制的有效性研究

邱虹1,朱南2,叶思妤3   

  1. 1.西华大学管理学院、国际经济与管理研究院,四川 成都610039;
    2.西南财经大学西部商业学院,四川 成都610074;
    3.四川师范大学商学院,四川 成都610101

  • 收稿日期:2020-08-27 修回日期:2021-03-15 出版日期:2021-08-20 发布日期:2021-08-13
  • 通讯作者: 叶思妤
  • 基金资助:
    西华大学国际经济与管理研究院创新基金(20200021)。

A research on the effectiveness of coordination mechanisms of central bank on cross-shipping

Qiu Hong1, Zhu Nan2, Ye Siyu3   

  1. 1. School of Management,Research Institute of International Economics and Management, Xihua University, Chengdu 610039, Sichuan, China;
    2. Western Business School, Southwestern University of Finance and Economics, Chengdu 610074, Sichuan, China; 
    3. Business School, Sichuan Normal University, Chengdu 610101, Sichuan, China
  • Received:2020-08-27 Revised:2021-03-15 Online:2021-08-20 Published:2021-08-13
  • Contact: Ye siyu

摘要:    在人民币发行与流通管理中,激励商业银行等私营金融机构履行其全额清分义务,减少重复调运有利于缓解中央银行在现金发行与清分处理上的成本压力。本文基于人民币现金闭环供应链框架,构建了商业银行的现金运行成本模型,分析了不同类型的商业银行在弹性罚款机制下现金清分与调运的最优策略,证明了该罚款机制能够激励商业银行对回笼现金进行全额清分,且对不同存取业务的银行具有奖励与惩罚双重作用。通过数值算例,深入讨论了弹性罚款机制对商业银行的重复调运量和现金运行成本的影响效果。研究结果表明:在弹性循环罚款和央行现行的代理发行库的双重机制下,商业银行重复调运量的降低幅度随单位押运成本的增加而增加,随现金保管价格和私人清分价格的降低而增加。对商业银行的现金运行成本的影响效果与央行清分服务价格同向变化,与代理发行库现金保管价格和私人清分价格成反向关系。

关键词: 人民币, 现金闭环供应链, 弹性罚款机制, 商业银行, 重复调运, 代理发行库

Abstract:     In order to avoid overuse of the public service of RMB cash issuance and processing, the People′s Bank of China (PBOC) has made a regulation on the fit-sorting of the cash returned to the RMB issue treasury from the private sector of commercial banks. Commercial banks, due to lack of corresponding supervision and punishment rules, driven by their own interests, are still tend to adopt cross-shipping to avoid fit-sorting obligations, which makes it difficult to implement the regulation of the central bank. To solve this problem, it is necessary for PBOC to choose the appropriate coordination mechanism to supervise and encourage the private sector in the cash supply chain to fulfill the duty of fit-sorting, reduce the cross-shipping and the social cost of the cash circulation. In this context, the research on coordination mechanism in the management of RMB issuance and circulation not only provides theoretical reference for PBOC to formulate relevant implementation rules, but also helps the banking industry to achieve the strategic goal: "safe circulation of cash, cost reduction, capital saving and efficiency increasing".
   With combination of the closed-loop supply chain theory with the practice of RMB issuance and circulation, the paper establishes the framework of cash closed-loop supply chain. In the forward cash supply chain, the commercial bank withdraws the issuing funds from the RMB issue treasury of the central bank to their commercial vaults,and pays them to the public at Banking Offices. So RMB cash enters the market and the currency issuance is completed. In the reverse cash supply chain, the public deposits their cash at commercial banking offices, then commercial banks recycle them to the RMB issue Treasury of the central bank and the currency withdrawal is completed.
   From the perspective of the incentive of commercial banks, we build a cost model about cash flow operation based on the framework of cash closed-loop supply chain. Next, we analyze the optimal strategy of fit-sorting and dispatching under the elastic fee on different types of commercial banks, and theoretically prove that this mechanism could motivate commercial banks to carry out fully fit-sorting. We compared the optimal strategy of fit-sorting the different types of commercial Banks through numerical examples, discussed the coordination effect of the elastic penalty mechanism on the cross-shipping decisions. And we reached the following conclusions: (1) the elastic penalty mechanism has the dual effect of reward and punishment for commercial banks with different deposits and withdrawals. To be specific, the commercial banks (A) with the amount of pays out withdrawal greater the deposits, must fit-sorting all the deposits to avoid punishment, while the commercial banks (B) with deposits less than the amount of pays out withdrawal, can be rewarded by choosing excessive fit-sorting. (2) Under the elastic penalty mechanism, commercial banks will change their original strategies of fit-sorting and dispatching, and the reduction for cross-shipping is positively related to escort price, and changes in the opposite direction with cash storage price as well as private fit-sorting price. (3) The impact effect of the elastic penalty mechanism on the cost of commercial banks is positively related to the price of fit-sorting service of the central bank, and changes in the opposite direction with the cash storage price of the issue Treasury and the private fit-sorting price. Therefore, under the trend of cash logistics outsourcing and cash processing cost reduction, the elastic penalty mechanism can promote commercial banks to reduce cross-shipping behavior more effectively and fulfill the duty of fit-sorting in a way with the minimum social cost.

Key words:  RMB, cash closed-loop supply chain, elastic penalty mechanism, commercial bank, cross-shipping, agent custodial inventory