政府补贴、税收优惠对专利质量的影响及其门槛效应——基于新能源汽车产业上市公司的实证分析

刘兰剑, 张萌, 黄天航

科研管理 ›› 2021, Vol. 42 ›› Issue (6) : 9-16.

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科研管理 ›› 2021, Vol. 42 ›› Issue (6) : 9-16.
论文

政府补贴、税收优惠对专利质量的影响及其门槛效应——基于新能源汽车产业上市公司的实证分析

  • 刘兰剑1,2,张萌1,2,黄天航3
作者信息 +

The impact of government subsidies and tax preferences on patent quality and its threshold effect——An empirical analysis based on the listed companies in the new energy automobile industry

  • Liu Lanjian1,2, Zhang Meng1,2, Huang Tianhang3
Author information +
文章历史 +

摘要

政府补贴和税收优惠既是推动创新的重要政策工具,也是世界各国扶持幼稚产业的重要手段。本文选取2010—2018年中国新能源汽车产业上市公司数据,在考察两种财税政策对专利质量影响的基础上,构建面板门槛模型,从政策工具组合使用绩效分析的视角,检验政府补贴和税收优惠组合使用时对专利质量的门槛效应。研究发现:第一,两种政策均对专利质量产生了正向的激励作用,且政府补贴的激励效果更胜一筹;第二,补贴并非越多越好,而是存在一定阈值,在该阈值范围内时,税收优惠作用最佳;第三,同样,税收优惠也存在相应的阈值,当优惠超过该值时,更有利于显现政府补贴的作用,识别并充分利用该阈值,才能实现两种政策工具的最优组合。

Abstract

   As one of China′s strategic emerging industries, the level of technological innovation of new energy vehicles determines whether China can occupy a favorable position in the international market. In order to encourage new energy vehicle companies to overcome technical difficulties, the Chinese government uses policy tools such as government subsidies and tax incentives to support corporate innovation. Among them, government subsidies, as unpaid government expenditure items, have high fund specificity. Enterprises that receive subsidies will list these funds as R&D investment, so as to reserve funds for technological innovation activities. The tax incentives are the after-tax income obtained when a company′s products are tested by the market, which can not only offset part of the research costs, but also alleviate the risks of corporate innovation to a certain extent. These policies respectively represent the "pre-incentive" and "post-incentive" of the enterprise innovation process, and the combination of them can realize the complementary advantages of policies.
    Many studies have analyzed the incentive effect of each policy on enterprise output. In reality, the government often uses a variety of policy tools to support the technological innovation of new energy vehicles. If there is a lack of effective policy linkage and combination allocation between different policies, resulting in policy tools "working alone", they will not be fully utilized and financial funds will be wasted. However, at present, there is a lack of theoretical and empirical research on the effects of different policy combinations, which makes it difficult to provide more accurate theoretical support for policy making.
    Based on the above analysis, this paper selects the data of listed companies in China′s new energy vehicle industry from 2010 to 2018 as the research object. On the one hand, this paper studies the effects of government subsidies and tax incentives on patent quality. On the other hand, from the perspective of policy collocation, this paper also constructs a panel threshold model to further analyze the threshold effect on patent quality when the two policies are used in combination. The research yielded three main findings. First, both policies have a positive incentive effect on patent quality, though the effect of government subsidies is stronger. Second, when used in combination, subsidies need to be at a medium level to maximize the effect of tax incentives. Third, high-level tax incentives are most conducive to promoting the effect of government subsidies. Only by identifying and making full use of the thresholds can the optimal combination of the two policy tools be realized.
    Therefore, the government should make full use of the direct advantages of government subsidies and the indirect advantages of tax incentives to achieve optimal coordination of policies. When different policies are used in combination, it is still necessary to pay attention to the appropriate policy inclination. Empirical evidence shows that excessive government subsidies will weaken the effectiveness of tax incentives. Therefore, it is necessary to grasp the appropriateness of new energy vehicle enterprises′ subsidies. At the same time, the government should further increase the scope of tax incentives for new energy vehicle companies, and use the supplementary function of tax incentives in stimulating innovation, so as to achieve complementary advantages of different policies.

关键词

政府补贴 / 税收优惠 / 专利质量 / 新能源汽车 / 门槛效应

Key words

 government subsidy / tax incentive / patent quality / new energy vehicle / threshold effect

引用本文

导出引用
刘兰剑, 张萌, 黄天航. 政府补贴、税收优惠对专利质量的影响及其门槛效应——基于新能源汽车产业上市公司的实证分析[J]. 科研管理. 2021, 42(6): 9-16
Liu Lanjian, Zhang Meng, Huang Tianhang. The impact of government subsidies and tax preferences on patent quality and its threshold effect——An empirical analysis based on the listed companies in the new energy automobile industry[J]. Science Research Management. 2021, 42(6): 9-16

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基金

国家社科基金项目:“‘一带一路’”产能合作的新能源汽车国际贸易网络研究(19BJY072,2019.07—2021.07);中央高校基金项目:“面向‘2035’的科技管理与贸易政策研究”(300102110610,2020.03—2023.03);面向2035的科普与公共政策研究(300102111606,2021.03—2022.12)。

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