国有企业混合所有制改革对创新绩效影响研究

熊爱华; 张质彬; 张涵

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科研管理 ›› 2021, Vol. 42 ›› Issue (6) : 73-83.

论文

国有企业混合所有制改革对创新绩效影响研究

熊爱华¹，张质彬¹，张涵²

作者信息 +

Impact of state-owned enterprise mixed ownership reform on innovation performance

Xiong Aihua¹, Zhang Zhibin¹, Zhang Han²

Author information +

文章历史 +

摘要

为推动混合所有制改革实现国有企业高质量发展，提高国有企业自主创新能力，本文从国有企业混合所有制改革的股权结构和高层治理两个维度出发，利用2008-2017年国有企业制造业上市公司数据，研究国有企业混合所有制改革对创新绩效的影响及作用机制。研究发现：（1）国有企业股权结构的改变并未对创新绩效产生明显影响，而非国有股东委派董监高明显促进了国有企业的创新绩效；（2）基于现金持有视角，非国有股东参股和委派代表均能提高国有企业现金持有对创新活动的投入意愿；（3）异质性分析结果显示，国有企业内外部环境的不同，混合所有制改革对创新绩效也存在明显的差异性影响。最后，本文研究结果为进一步深化国有企业混合所有制改革提供了重要的政策建议。

Abstract

In the context of China′s high-quality development, the driving force of development is gradually changing to innovation driven, and the importance of independent innovation is further enhanced. Enterprise innovation is the key to national independent innovation, which is of great significance to the high quality and sustainable development of enterprises. Compared with non-state-owned enterprises, insufficient innovation motivation of state-owned enterprises will not only reduce the competitiveness and sustainable development capabilities, but also have an adverse impact on the high-quality development of the entire society and industrial transformation and upgrading. However, with the deepening of mixed ownership reform, state-owned enterprises have changed the original ownership structure and governance mechanism. Improving R&D capacity and stimulating innovation vitality will be the focus of state-owned enterprise reform, which is bound to have an important impact on the innovation level of state-owned enterprises. Then, how to promote the innovation performance of state-owned enterprises has become an important topic of common concern in academic and practical circles.
At present, scholars have carried out a lot of research on the relationship between the mixed reform of state-owned enterprises and innovation, most of the literature mainly focuses on the impact of ownership structure. As the fundamental institutional arrangement of enterprises, the ownership structure has an important impact on the innovation behavior of enterprises. There is a lack of research on the "reform" level of state-owned enterprises, that is, the impact of high-level governance on innovation. Based on this, from the perspective of "mixed" and "reform" of state-owned enterprises, this paper will explore whether the mixed ownership reform measure of introducing non-state-owned capital into state-owned enterprises can activate the innovation vitality of state-owned enterprises and improve their innovation performance, and try to clarify the mechanism of the impact of mixed reform of state-owned enterprises on innovation performance, so as to promote the high-quality sustainable development of state-owned enterprises and the whole national economy. Sustainable development has important theoretical and practical significance. Based on the data of manufacturing listed companies of state-owned enterprises from 2008 to 2017, this paper discusses the influence mechanism of state-owned enterprises mixed ownership reform on innovation performance.
The main conclusions of this paper are as follows:(1) The change of ownership structure does not have a significant impact on innovation performance of state-owned enterprises, while non-state-owned shareholders play a significant role in promoting innovation performance through high-level governance.(2) The mixed ownership reform improves the promotion effect of state-owned enterprises′ cash holdings on innovation performance.(3) The different nature of control right, industry characteristics and market environment of state-owned enterprises will result in the different impact of mixed reform of state-owned enterprises on innovation performance.(4) The appointment of directors, supervisors and senior executives by non-state-owned shareholders has a positive impact on the substantive innovation of enterprises.(5) The mixed ownership reform improves the total factor productivity and enterprise value of state-owned enterprises. This paper has certain theoretical significance and practical value to deeply understand the economic consequences and mechanism of mixed ownership reform of state-owned enterprises.
The conclusions of this paper provide more specific policy implications for state-owned enterprises to improve the level of innovation performance and stimulate the innovation vitality of state-owned enterprises. First, in the process of mixed ownership reform of state-owned enterprises, non-state-owned shareholders should expand their participation, give full play to its governance role, the motivation of appointing management should be improved, the governance system of state-owned enterprises should be perfected, and the existing decision-making mechanism should be optimized. Second, combined with the characteristics of industry types, the state-owned enterprises should further implement the classified reform ideas, carry out targeted mixed reform of state-owned enterprises, and do not copy mechanically or blindly reform. Third, strengthen the construction of the regional institutional environment, improve the degree of regional openness and establish a fair external competitive environment, optimize the allocation of market resources, and comprehensively improve the level of marketization. Fourth, the mixed reform of state-owned enterprises is not the purpose, on the basis of paying attention to the ownership structure, we should implement and improve the enterprise management and decision-making mechanism, fully mobilize the enthusiasm of non-state-owned capital, stimulate the innovation vitality of state-owned enterprises, and better assist the high-quality development of state-owned enterprises.

导出引用

熊爱华张质彬张涵. 国有企业混合所有制改革对创新绩效影响研究[J]. 科研管理. 2021, 42(6): 73-83

Xiong Aihua, Zhang Zhibin, Zhang Han. Impact of state-owned enterprise mixed ownership reform on innovation performance[J]. Science Research Management. 2021, 42(6): 73-83

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基金

山东省社科规划重点项目：“‘双循环’战略背景下山东省国有资本布局优化路径与对策研究”（21BGLJO2，2020.09—2023.12）；山东省社科规划青年项目：“新旧动能转换背景下山东省国有企业混合所有制改革路径与治理效应研究”（21DGLJ20，2020.09—2023.12）；山东省人文社会科学课题：“基于品牌生态系统的山东省创新型产业集群发展对策研究”（2020-NDGL-08，2020.05—2022.01）。