企业绿色创新视角下“环保督政”的价值创造效应——基于环保约谈的准实验研究

王旭; 张晓宁; 朱然

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科研管理 ›› 2021, Vol. 42 ›› Issue (6) : 102-111.

论文

企业绿色创新视角下“环保督政”的价值创造效应——基于环保约谈的准实验研究

王旭¹，张晓宁¹，朱然²

作者信息 +

The value creation effect of "environmental supervision" from the perspective of enterprise green innovation——A quasi-experimental research based on environmental protection admonition#br#

Wang Xu¹, Zhang Xiaoning¹, Zhu Ran²

Author information +

文章历史 +

摘要

环保约谈政策的制定与实施，拉开了中国“环保督政”的序幕，并对微观层面的企业环境战略产生了重要影响。本文以环保约谈政策的颁布作为研究契机，结合准实验研究与倍差法，重点探讨环保约谈对企业绿色创新这一“能动式”环境战略的政策效果和作用机制。研究显示：环保约谈为地方政府引致的生态治理压力，能够驱动企业的绿色创新战略，进而产生价值创造作用；从制度供给的路径效应来看，被约谈的地方政府所采取的普惠型制度显著促进了辖区内企业绿色创新绩效，然而选择型制度的路径效应不显著，但两类制度形成的政策组合是驱动企业绿色创新的有效制度形式；从产权性质的调节效应来看，政府被约谈后，辖区内的民营企业能够通过绿色创新战略积极响应政府的环境治理压力，并且对普惠型制度供给具有较强的敏感性。相比之下，具有“政策响应刚性”的国有企业未能利用绿色创新战略响应政府的号召，这可能与国有企业对被动性的末端治理战略的偏好性有关。本文不仅能够在绿色创新视角下完善中国环境政策实施效果的相关研究，还有利于厘清环境政策对企业环境战略的影响机理，能够为中国生态文明建设提供有益参考。

Abstract

The formulation and implementation of environmental protection interview policy has opened the prelude of "environmental supervision" in China, and has an important impact on the micro level of enterprise environmental strategy. This paper takes the promulgation of environmental protection interview policy as a research opportunity, combined with quasi-experimental research and Difference-in-Difference model, mainly discusses the policy effect and mechanism of environmental protection admonition on the "dynamic" environmental strategy of enterprise green innovation.
The results show that: First, the environmental protection interview policy has significantly promoted the green innovation performance of enterprises within the government area under the interview. The value creation effect of green innovation is not only conducive to the local government to recover the negative impact caused by the interview, but also can gain a comparative advantage in the environmental protection competition. More importantly, green innovation effectively promotes the incentive compatibility between government and enterprises, making it possible for enterprises to respond positively to the government′s pressure on environmental governance. Second, the inclusive system and its policy combination with the selective system are powerful tools for local governments to drive enterprises′ green innovation. Under the condition of inclusive system supply, the environment for the development of innovative talents, the protection of intellectual property rights and the environment for the transformation of achievements have been greatly improved, which has stimulated the green innovation motivation of enterprises. But relying solely on selective institutional supply may crowd out investment in innovation and weaken entrepreneurial risk-taking. Under the combination effect of the two policy tools, enterprises′ green innovation ability and innovation will are simultaneously stimulated. Thirdly, the path effect of institutional supply shows significant heterogeneity among enterprises with different property rights. After the local government is interviewed, private enterprises can respond to the pressure of environmental governance through green innovation strategy, and show strong dependence on the resources brought by the inclusive system. In contrast, due to the lack of willingness to take risks or the inability to meet the systematic and complex requirements of green innovation, state-owned enterprises fail to make strategic response through green innovation and choose the environmental strategy of end-governance instead.
The research contributions of this paper are as follows: First of all, based on the related research of environmental strategy, the research perspective of environmental protection admonition policy effect is expanded from passive pollution control to active value creation, revealing the policy impact of environmental protection admonition on enterprise green innovation. Secondly, based on the strict exogenous environmental policy, this paper extends the green innovation decision-making motivation from the organizational endogenous perspective to the external policy environment, thus enriching the related research on the driving factors of green innovation. Moreover, based on the perspective of institutional supply, the paper takes the inclusive and selective institutional supply as the policy tools for local governments to respond to environmental protection interviews, comprehensively presents the impact mechanism of the institutional choice of local governments interviewed on the green innovation of micro enterprises, and opens the black box of the role of environmental policies on enterprise value creation.

导出引用

王旭张晓宁朱然. 企业绿色创新视角下“环保督政”的价值创造效应——基于环保约谈的准实验研究[J]. 科研管理. 2021, 42(6): 102-111

Wang Xu, Zhang Xiaoning, Zhu Ran. The value creation effect of "environmental supervision" from the perspective of enterprise green innovation——A quasi-experimental research based on environmental protection admonition#br#[J]. Science Research Management. 2021, 42(6): 102-111

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基金

国家自然科学基金青年项目：“绿色技术创新导向下中国制造业企业融资契约最优动态配置研究——基于双层嵌套结构的整合边界效应”（71802117，2019—2021）；教育部人文社会科学研究青年基金项目：“绿色技术创新导向下制造业企业融资契约最优配置研究——基于治理情境的动态边界效应”（18YJC630186，2018—2020）。