技术战略联盟是合作伙伴资源共享、提高技术创新效率和共同创造价值的组织，但其创新活动往往伴随着各类风险，在实践中很多联盟的运行没有达到预期效果。如何降低联盟的运行风险，优化合作路径既是理论的前沿问题，也是实践亟待解决的难题。本文研究了技术战略联盟运行风险、协同合作与联盟稳定的关系，通过实证研究，结果表明：第一，技术战略联盟运行过程中利益冲突风险和分歧冲突风险会降低联盟的稳定性，而联盟依赖风险初期会提高联盟绩效，但随着依赖程度的逐渐加深，参与各方的自主开拓创新能力有可能受损，从而降低联盟绩效；第二，联盟内部的自主合作可以正向调节技术战略联盟运行中利益冲突风险、分歧冲突风险与联盟绩效的关系，并且削弱联盟依赖风险对联盟绩效的倒U型效应，从而起到协同优化的作用。政府扶持对技术战略联盟运行风险与联盟稳定关系的调节作用并不明显。

     In the context of diversified markets with technological changes and increased competition, enterprises will inevitably improve their competitiveness through technological innovation in order to survive and develop. By building technological strategic alliances, companies can collaborate with universities and research institutions to respond to advances in new technologies, and to make it easier to access key resources which enables them to achieve their business goals and enhance their competitive advantages with higher efficiency. Technological strategic alliances are organizations in which partners share resources, improve the efficiency of technological innovation and jointly create value. However, their innovation activities are often accompanied by various risks. In practice, many alliances fail to achieve the expected results. How to lower the operation risk of the alliances and optimize the cooperation is not only a frontier problem in theory, but also a difficult problem in practice? This paper studies strategic alliances′ operational risk, collaboration and the factors that affect the stability of the alliance. This has certain guiding value for the theoretical research and practical development of the technological strategic alliance.
    Firstly, this paper defines and analyzes three operational risks (risk of conflict of interests, risk of conflict from disagreement and risk of dependency in alliances), coordinated cooperation mode of the alliances (autonomous cooperation and government support) and the stability of the alliance. Then five hypotheses are proposed: H1: The risk of conflict of interests in the operation of the alliance has a significantly low impact on the stability of the alliance. H2: The risk of conflict from disagreement in the operation of the alliance has a significantly low impact on the stability of the alliance. H3: There is an inverted U-shaped relationship between the risk of dependency in alliances and the stability of the alliance. H4: The coordinated cooperation mode of the alliances can positively adjust the relationship between the risk of conflict of interests, conflict from disagreement and the stability of the alliance. H5: The coordinated cooperation mode of the alliances weakens the inverse U-shaped effect of the risk of dependency in alliances on the stability of the alliance. This study collected data through questionnaires. From June to December 2016, with the support of the Ministry of Science and Technology, and its industrial technology innovation strategic alliance evaluation system, we conducted surveys by sending e-mails and on-site questionnaires. In the end, 400 questionnaires were issued and 324 valid questionnaires were obtained. Through empirical study, the results show that: Firstly, in the running process of technological strategic alliances, the risk of conflict of interests and conflict from disagreement will reduce the stability of the alliances. The risk of dependency in alliances can improve the alliances performance in early stage. However, as the degree of dependency increases, the independent innovation ability of the involved parties may be damaged, thereby reducing alliance performance. 
   Secondly, autonomous cooperation within the alliance can positively adjust the relationship between the risk of conflict of interests and conflict from disagreement and alliance performance in the operation of technological strategic alliances. Moreover, it can weaken the inverted U-shaped effect of the risk of dependency in alliances on alliance performance. The effect of government support on the relationship between operational risk and stability of technological strategic alliances is not obvious. The conclusions of this paper have guiding value for the technological strategic alliance and its members. The collaborative efforts of members of the technological strategic alliance to create new knowledge and discover new opportunities to a large extent depend on the knowledge sharing among partners, but this also leads to that knowledge and technology brought to the alliance by members is easily accessible to their partners. It can increase the motivation of the other party′s betrayal, the risk of knowledge leakage and embezzlement. The resulting losses are harmful to the stability of the alliance, so technical confidentiality measures and other risk prevention measures should be increased. In addition, alliance members form alliances for common strategic goals, but members generally set goals based on their own positions. It leads to differences in the cognition of the alliance′s strategic goals among members, and some members even will have goals and expectations that are not in line with the actual situation, which will affect the stability of the alliance. Therefore, in formulating the strategic goals of the alliance, we must fully consider the positions of the members, so that different members can be as consistent as possible in the understanding of the same strategic goals of the alliance. Also, distribution of profit in the process of alliance development should be timely adjusted so that a member is rewarded in response to its contribution. It can reduce the risk brought by profit distribution. 
   Thirdly, the alliance can encourage members to communicate regularly by adopting reasonable rules and regulations, encourage members to increase resources investment to the alliance, maintain or establish alliance entities, etc. These measures can alleviate conflicts among alliance partners, reduce alliance risks, improve the enthusiasm of members to participate in alliances, and increase the possibility of success of the alliance. Government support has a direct positive impact on the stability of technological strategic alliances, but its adjustment effect on the relationship between operational risk and alliance stability is not obvious. It indicates that the government as a guide for the formation of strategic alliances, in order to promote the formation and development of the alliance, the government should take some effective methods and measures to support the alliance, and provide financial support and guidance for the alliance, which can promote the stability of strategic alliances. The government provides effective external guarantees for the development of the alliance. However, the technological strategic alliance is a multi-party cooperation, so management is difficult to unify, and jurisdiction of government is not clear inside the alliance. Therefore, the government has little role in regulating the risks caused by various conflicts in the operation of the alliance. The Chinese government should set up a special organization to manage the technological strategic alliance, strengthen the supervision over the cooperative behaviors of all parties in the operation of the alliance, timely find conflicts, reduce risks and promote the stable development of the alliance. 
   Finally, the members of the alliance still need to invest human and material resources in independent innovation to form their own core competitiveness while acquiring the external knowledge shared by the alliance partners. And the alliance needs to improve the intellectual property protection system and corresponding regulations, so as to provide a basis for determining the division of ownership and use rights of intellectual property generated within the alliance.