基于绿色创新补助政策的银企系统性风险研究

doi:10.19571/j.cnki.1000-2995.2021.10.018

摘要/Abstract

摘要： 降低银行与绿色创新企业间面临的系统性风险已成为中国现阶段经济发展亟待解决的问题。本文将银行与绿色创新企业两类主体作为研究对象，构建人工银企系统，基于仿真实验着重考察其重要主体行为。具体地，着重于考察资产负债表构建与更新、主体行为动态演化、流动性资产更新以及违约清算机制等方面，通过仿真手段探究绿色创新补助政策形式与补助强度对银企系统性风险与系统总收益的影响机制，以对理论模型进行全面验证。本研究结论的意义在于：聚焦于绿色创新补助政策与银企系统性风险的内在关系，通过计算实验方法进行验证与延伸，为促进中国绿色创新企业健康发展，帮助政府与银行防范绿色创新企业可能导致的系统性风险提供理论机制参考与新观点。

关键词: 绿色创新, 绿色创新补助政策, 银行, 绿色创新企业（GIE）, 系统性风险

Abstract: Reducing the systemic risk of banks and green innovative enterprises is the primary task of accelerating the national innovative capability and economy development of China. Based on the theoretical model of the system of banks-green innovative enterprises, this paper studies the subject behavior of banks and green innovative enterprises, the system evolution rules of banks and green innovative enterprises based on the balance sheet construction and update of banks and green innovative enterprises, the dynamic evolution of the subject behavior, the liquidity asset update, and the default settlement of banks and green innovative enterprises, constructs the artificial bank-green innovative enterprise system under the intervention of green innovation subsidies, and investigates the influence mechanism of the policy form and intensity of green innovation subsidies on the systemic risk and total system returns of banks and green innovative enterprises through adopting computational experimental methods. The research finds that: To begin with, the green innovation subsidy policy has a significant positive effect on the systemic risk of banks and green innovative enterprises. Specifically, green innovation subsidy policy can reduce the number of bankruptcies of banks and green innovative enterprises. However, these policies are unable to improve the total return of banks and enterprises which decreases with the reduction of systemic risk. To put it differently, there is a law of diminishing marginal utility. Secondly, the effects of different forms of subsidy policies and preferential margins on the systemic risks and total system returns of banks and green innovative enterprises have significant heterogeneous characteristics. Last but not least, the mix of the three green innovation subsidy policies is obviously better than the single green innovation subsidy policy, which plays an imperative role in reducing the systemic risk of banks and green innovative enterprises, requires lower policy costs, and has obvious "synergistic effect".Research Innovations: Firstly, compared to the prior literatures, we consider the internal relationship between green innovation subsidy policy and systemic risk in banks and green innovative enterprises. At the same time, we adopt the computational experiments to construct a realistic artificial bank-green innovative enterprise system which is able to precisely reveal the effects of different periods and forms of green innovation subsidies on systemic risks. Secondly, we expand and make up for the existing empirical researches which has difficulty in obtaining data between banks and green innovative enterprises. Then, we investigate and compare the heterogeneity of subsidy policies for green innovation and its impact on bank-enterprise systemic risks and total system returns. Eventually, we propose the optimal subsidy forms to accelerate green innovation under bank-green innovative enterprise systemic risks of different periods, and the systemic risk compensation mechanism that the government can adopt under different circumstances.This study extends the relationship and internal mechanism between green innovation subsidy policies and bank-green innovative enterprise systemic risk, so as to provide institutional reference and new viewpoints for accelerating the healthy development of green innovative enterprises of China and helping the government and banks prevent the possible systemic risks caused by massive green innovative enterprises.

Key words: green innovation, green innovation subsidy policy, bank, green innovative enterprise (GIE), systemic risk

杨文珂马钱挺何建敏苏屹. 基于绿色创新补助政策的银企系统性风险研究[J]. 科研管理, 2021, 42(10): 156-165.

Yang Wenke, Ma Qianting, He Jianmin, Su Yi. A study of the systemic risks of banks and green innovation enterprises based on green innovation subsidy policies[J]. Science Research Management, 2021, 42(10): 156-165.

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