专用性投资类型、治理机制与海外知识获取的关系研究

王雷, 朱莹, 王圣君

科研管理 ›› 2021, Vol. 42 ›› Issue (1) : 156-167.

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科研管理 ›› 2021, Vol. 42 ›› Issue (1) : 156-167.
论文

专用性投资类型、治理机制与海外知识获取的关系研究

  • 王雷,朱莹,王圣君
作者信息 +

A research on the relationship among specific investment type, control mechanisms and overseas knowledge acquisition

  • Wang Lei, Zhu Ying, Wang Shengjun
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文章历史 +

摘要

本文从知识复杂度出发,探索代工专用性投资类型(资产类专用性投资和人力资本类专用性投资)与治理机制的匹配关系对海外知识获取的影响。应用AMOS17.0和SPSS16.0对229个中国代工企业样本数据进行实证检验,结论显示:(1)不同治理机制对不同类型专用性投资与海外知识获取关系具有不同的调节效应。具体来看,合同治理与资产类专用性投资的交互作用对海外知识获取有积极影响,关系治理与人力资本类专用性投资的交互作用对海外知识获取有积极影响,而不合理的匹配关系(即合同治理VS人力资本类专用性投资;关系治理VS资产类专用性投资)对海外知识获取的影响是不显著的。(2)专用性投资类型与治理机制的匹配效应随知识复杂度的变化而变化。具体来看,在知识复杂度较低的情况下,合同治理与资产类专用性投资的交互作用对海外知识获取的促进作用更显著。在知识复杂度较高的情况下关系治理与人力资本类专用性投资的交互作用对海外知识获取的促进作用更显著。上述研究阐明了代工专用性资产类型、治理机制和知识复杂度的匹配关系对海外知识获取的影响,有助于指导代工企业依据专用性资产类型和知识复杂度选择适宜的治理机制,进而获取更好的海外知识获取绩效。

Abstract

This paper explores the impact of the matching relationship between the specific types of investments (physical specific investment and human specific investment) and control mechanisms on overseas knowledge acquisition among different knowledge complexity scenarios. Applying AMOS 17.0 and SPSS16.0 to test empirically the sample data of 229 Chinese local companies, the results show that:
   Firstly, the matching relationship between different types of specific investments and different governance mechanisms is verified through the classification of specific investments. Specifically, the interaction between contractual control and physical specific investment has a positive impact on overseas knowledge acquisition and the interaction between relational control and human specific investment has a positive impact on overseas knowledge acquisition, while unreasonable matching relationship between specific investment and control mechanisms (i.e. contract control v.s. human specific investment; relational control v.s. physical specific investment) on overseas knowledge acquisition is not significant. This result further enriches the study on the protection mechanisms of specific investments in transaction cost theory and helps suppliers to choose different governance mechanisms according to different types of specific investments.
   Secondly, through the study of knowledge types in the foundry business, we clarify the different effects of the matching relationship between specific investments and control mechanisms on overseas knowledge under different knowledge complexity. Specifically, the interaction between contract control and physical specific investment is more significant in promoting overseas knowledge acquisition at lower knowledge complexity, while the interaction between relational control and human specific investment is more significant in promoting overseas knowledge acquisition at higher knowledge complexity. This finding suggests that when the knowledge complexity in contemporary industrial services increases with firm upgrading, the effect of contract control and physical specific investment on overseas knowledge acquisition decreases, while the effect of relational control and human specific investment on overseas knowledge acquisition increases.
   Thirdly, this result finds that contract control and relationship control are applicable to different types of transactions in the context of transition systems. Specifically, trust-based relationship control can hardly improve the positive impact of physical specific investments on overseas knowledge acquisition, while contract control, which does not rely on social relationships, can help promote the positive impact of physical investments on overseas knowledge acquisition. The above research shows that even though China is still in the process of institutional transformation and the construction of formal systems is not yet complete, contract control still plays an important role in coordinating international cooperative relationships.
   Although this paper illustrates the impact of the matching relationship between specific asset types, control mechanisms and knowledge complexity on overseas knowledge acquisition, which helps guide companies to select appropriate control mechanisms based on knowledge complexity and specific asset types, and to get better overseas knowledge acquisition performance. There are still some limitations. First, this paper only considers the impact of physical investment and human capital specific investment on overseas knowledge acquisition. In the future, we should further explore more dimensions of specific investments. Second, this paper only considers the impact of specific investment on overseas knowledge acquisition. Future research can explore whether specific investment, cooperation frequency and uncertainty will have different impact on overseas knowledge acquisition. Third, due to the limitation of data acquisition, the data in this paper uses cross-sections. Using panel data will obtain more valuable research results.

关键词

专用性投资 / 合同治理 / 关系治理 / 知识复杂度 / 海外知识获取

Key words

 specific investment / contract control / relational control / knowledge complexity / overseas knowledge acquisition

引用本文

导出引用
王雷, 朱莹, 王圣君. 专用性投资类型、治理机制与海外知识获取的关系研究[J]. 科研管理. 2021, 42(1): 156-167
Wang Lei, Zhu Ying, Wang Shengjun. A research on the relationship among specific investment type, control mechanisms and overseas knowledge acquisition[J]. Science Research Management. 2021, 42(1): 156-167

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基金

国家自然科学基金项目:“技术寻求型对外直接投资企业海外知识获取与反向溢出效应研究”(71572032,2015—2019);中央高校基本科研业务费专项资金(CUSF-DH-D-2020087)。

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