关键词: 两权匹配, 两权分离, 终极控股股东, 科技创新能力, 股权激励

Abstract: R&D activities are the most important part of technological innovation. However, due to the characteristics of higher initial investment, higher risk and longer cycle, the executives are unwilling to take risks, and this will lead to the containment of technological innovation ability of the enterprises. As an incentive mechanism design to alleviate the agency conflict between managers and shareholders, managerial equity incentive can effectively stimulate the executives take some risk decisions such as supporting the technological innovation. But on the other hand, as the shares hold by the executives increased following the managerial equity incentive plans, the risk and cost of the failure of R&D will be increased, which will reduce executives′ willingness to support the company′s technological innovation. So, there is not a unified conclusion of the impact of managerial equity incentive on the company′s technological innovation. The current research on the relationship between managerial equity incentive and company′s technological innovation is mainly based on the agency problem between the management and the shareholders, ignoring the governance effect of ultimate controlling shareholder. So,we study the impact of the implementation of the managerial equity incentive on the company′s technological innovation capability in different ultimate controlling shareholder′ characteristics. Through the factor analysis, we construct the comprehensive capability index of innovation from the input, output and the transformation ability of scientific and technological innovation. Using OLS regression, we find that, in the environment of the matching of cash flow right and control right for ultimate controlling shareholder, managerial equity incentive can enhance the company′s technological innovation capability, and the stronger control power of controlling shareholder, the greater promotion effect can be achieved by managerial equity incentive. On the contrary, in the environment of the separation of cash flow right and control right for ultimate controlling shareholder, managerial equity incentive will inhibit the company′s technological innovation capability. We also find that, when the separation of two rights of ultimate controlling shareholder, there is no significant difference effect of managerial equity incentive on the company′s technological innovation capability between the companies with state-owned controlling shareholder and with the controlling shareholder of private entrepreneur. While there is significant difference of managerial equity incentive on the technological innovation capability of the companies with the controlling shareholder of private capitalists compared to that of the companies with the controlling shareholder of private entrepreneur.

Key words: matching of cash flow right and control right, separation of cash flow right and control right, ultimate controlling shareholder, technological innovation capability, managerial equity incentive