本文从政府资源分配视角，研究地方政府“创新崇拜”与企业专利泡沫的关系。结果发现，地方政府对创新企业的支持存在“重专利数量，轻专利质量”的现象，专利数量越多，政府补贴和税收优惠越多，但专利质量与政府资源配给无明显的关系，这一现象随着地区市场化程度的提高有所缓解。进一步的研究发现，与专利数量相比，专利质量对企业业绩的提升影响更明显，专利质量获得的市场超额收益率越高。本文的研究有助于创新资源的合理配置，也为政府制定创新鼓励政策提供了参考。

 From the angle of government resources allocation, this paper examines the relationship between local government “R&D worship” and enterprise patent bubbles. The results show that emphasizing patent quantity and neglecting patent quality obviously exists in local governments’ support for innovative enterprises. The more patents, the higher the government subsidies and the more tax incentives, but there is no obvious relationship between patent quality and government resources allocation; however, this situation has been alleviated with the improvement of marketization. Further studies show that patent quality is more helpful than patent quantity to improve enterprise performance and patent quality also gains more excess return than patent quantity. The research of this paper is helpful to rational distribution of innovative resources, and it also provides a reference for the government to develop innovative incentive policies.