以2010-2012年宣告实施股票期权激励计划并进行行权的上市公司为研究对象，研究股票期权激励计划对公司研发支出行为的影响。发现，在基数期公司研发支出强度与是否实行股票期权激励计划呈显著正相关；而在行权等待期公司研发支出强度变化与是否实行股票期权激励计划呈显著负相关，说明经理人存在很强的动机利用研发支出进行盈余操纵，以获取由股票期权激励带来更大的经济利益；研究还发现，经理人管理权力加剧了这种操纵行为，作为嵌入公司治理结构保护中小股东利益的独立董事制度发挥了一定的治理作用。本研究结论为政策制定者调整相关股权激励政策提供了参考。

In this paper，by the research of the listed companies that proclaimed the stock option incentive scheme in 2010-2012 and implemented this scheme in China，we study the role of the stock option incentive scheme on the R&D expenditure behaviors. We find that during the base period，the relation of the R&D expenditure intensity and whether to implement the stock option incentive scheme is significantly positive，but during the waiting period，the relation of the change of the R&D expenditure intensity and whether to implement the stock option incentive scheme is significantly negative. Which indicates that the managers have a strong motivation to get greater economic benefits by making use of the R&D expenditure to manipulate earnings，and we also find that the managerial power of the managers exacerbates this manipulation，as embedded in the corporate governance structure to protect the interests of small shareholders，the independent director system plays a role. The study can provide the constructive suggestions for the policy makers to adjust the relevant equity incentive policies.