从行为经济学的视角出发，基于风险因子理论，理论解释了公司业绩与国企高管隐性腐败行为之间的内在作用机理，并利用我国A股2010-2014年国有上市公司数据，实证检验了二者关系。研究发现：公司业绩持续向好时，在参照点效应和过度乐观的双重作用下，国企高管舞弊个别风险因子上升，进而隐性腐败倾向增大；进一步，国有企业的内部治理机制以及所面临的外部制度环境会对二者关系产生影响，即八项规定的颁布与高质量的内部控制体系能够对冲国企高管的舞弊一般风险因子，有效抑制隐性腐败行为。

From the point of view of behavioral economics, this study theoretically explains and empirically tests the relationship between the intrinsic control mechanism of corporate performance and management hidden corruption within Chinese SOEs by using a data of Chinese State-owned listed companies in China ‘A stock market’ between year 2010 to 2014. Results suggest that managements’ individual fraud risks are raised under the dual impact of reference point effect and over-optimism. As results of the management hidden corruption increased when company performance continues improving. Further, this study finds that internal governance mechanism and external regulations affect the relationship between corporate performance and management hidden corruption in Chinese SOEs. Results of this study suggest that high quality internal control systems and external regulations such as the “Eight-Point Regulation” effectively restrain management corruption.