以核心企业主导下的创新网络中企业创新合作行为作为实验背景，以初始禀赋异质的公共品博弈实验作为基准，通过引入多种机制，考察并比较不同机制对于改善公共品实验期数效应，以及提升网络成员合作水平的作用和显著性，并筛选最优机制。研究表明，奖励机制与领导机制单独产生的效果不能维持企业合作的高水平；惩罚机制、奖惩联合机制和领导机制下的奖惩联合机制则能有效缓解企业合作的脆弱性。

With the background of innovation cooperative behavior in the innovation network under the guidance of the core enterprise, and the heterogeneity of the initial public goods game as the benchmark, through introducing various mechanisms, this paper enhances the effect and significance of the level of cooperation between network members, and selects the optimal mechanism. The results show that the effect of incentive mechanism and leadership mechanism alone can not maintain the high level of enterprise cooperation; the joint mechanism of punishment, rewards and punishments and leadership mechanism can effectively mitigate the vulnerability of enterprise cooperation.