基于代理理论和创新理论，探讨股权集中度对高新技术企业自主创新投资的影响。本文以中国A股上市高新技术企业为样本，运用联立方程组模型和三阶段最小二乘法，实证分析了不同控制权性质企业，股权集中度、管理者薪酬组合与企业自主创新投资之间的关系。研究结果显示：（1）在国有控股高新技术企业，股权集中度越高，管理者货币薪酬越高，股权薪酬越低，较低的股权薪酬诱导管理者提高货币薪酬；在非国有控股高新技术企业，股权集中度越高，管理者货币薪酬越低，股权薪酬越高，较高的股权薪酬强化了管理者提高货币薪酬的权力。（2）在国有控股高新技术企业，增加货币薪酬会诱导管理者降低企业自主创新投资，而在非国有控股高新技术企业，增加货币薪酬会激励管理者提高企业自主创新投资；在国有控股或非国有控股高新技术企业，管理者股权薪酬对企业自主创新投资均具有“N型”影响关系。

Based on the agency theory and innovation theory, we analyze the effect of ownership concentration on independent innovation investment in high-tech enterprises. Taking A-share listed high-tech enterprises in China as a sample, using simultaneous-equation models and three-stage least-squares method, this papers empirically analyses the relationships among ownership concentration, managerial compensation package and independent innovation investment in enterprises of different control rights. The research results indicate that: (1) in state-owned high-tech enterprises, the higher the ownership concentration, the higher the managerial monetary compensation and the lower the equity compensation，and lower equity compensation further induces manager to raise monetary compensation; while in non-state-owned high-tech enterprises, the higher the ownership concentration, the lower the managerial monetary compensation and the higher the equity compensation，and higher equity compensation further strengthens the managerial power to raise monetary compensation. (2) In state-owned high-tech enterprises, increasing monetary compensation will induce managers to reduce the independent innovation investment, but in non-state-owned high-tech enterprise, increasing monetary compensation will encourage managers to increase the independent innovation investment; in both the state-owned and non-state-owned high-tech enterprises, the managers' equity compensation has an "N-type" impact relationship on independent innovation investment.