随着市场竞争的不断加剧，隐性知识成为决定企业竞争优势的根本因素。基于交易成本理论，该研究探讨了研发联盟中契约完备程度与隐性知识获取之间的关系，并分析了竞争强度与程序公平对上述关系的调节作用。通过来自于中国196个研发联盟样本数据的实证分析，该研究发现契约完备程度与隐性知识获取之间存在着显著的倒U型关系；竞争强度负向调节该倒U型关系，而程序公平对上述关系没有显著的影响。

In toady’s competitive markets, tacit knowledge has become an important source of competitive advantage for firms. Building on TCT theory, this study investigates the effect of contractual completeness on the acquisition of tacit knowledge, and the moderating role of competition intensity and procedural fairness. Results from a sample of 196 R&D alliances in China demonstrate that contractual completeness has an inverted U-shaped relationship with acquisition of tacit knowledge. In addition, this study finds that the inverted U-shaped relationship between contractual completeness and tacit knowledge acquisition is weaker when competition intensity is high, while the impact of contractual completeness on tacit knowledge acquisition is not influenced by procedural fairness.