代际传承与治理转型是困扰我国家族企业的重大现实难题，也是学术研究的热点。以控制权配置理论为基础，构建博弈模型揭示了法律制度、经理人市场和企业技术能力等因素及其交互作用对家族企业治理模式选择和动态演进的影响机理，并利用中国家族控股上市公司数据进行实证检验。研究发现，宏观层面的法律制度、经理人市场及微观层面的技术能力均对家族企业治理转型进程产生重要影响。具体来讲，家族企业所在地区的投资者保护越完善，经理人市场越发达，创始人家族越倾向将控制权让渡给职业经理人；反之，则更倾向选择子女接班。此外，企业技术生产率越高，家族企业治理转型对制度环境的依赖性越弱，越容易实现由家族治理向职业经理人治理转型。

Hereditary succession and governance transformation are great puzzles to hinder the development of Chinese family firms, and also hot topics of academic scholars. Based on the theory of allocation of control rights, this paper builds a model to explore the impact of law institutions, manager market and corporate technological capability on the choice and evolution of governance models of family firms, and then makes an empirical test using samples of Chinese family holding enterprises. The results show that, both law institutions and manager market in macro-level and technological capability in micro-level play great role on governance transformation of family firms. Specifically, founders tend to transfer control rights to professional managers with the improvement of law institutions and manager market; otherwise they prefer to descendant succession and implosive family governance. In addition, the dependence of governance transformation on institutional environments reduces with the increasing of technological capability.